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The full
11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has
declined to review whether a male prison inmate suffered cruel and
unusual punishment when a female guard forced him to masturbate.
Only
Judge Rosemary Barkett contested the court's
order denying en banc review of the Eighth Amendment claim of
Boxer X, who alleges guard
Angela Harris threatened him with
disciplinary action if he did not strip and masturbate for her
enjoyment while he was incarcerated in a Georgia prison.
"The use of prison
disciplinary procedures to extract sexual favors from prisoners is
the type of conduct that is at the heart of what the Eighth
Amendment proscribes," Barkett said in a dissent.
A three-judge panel
dismissed the inmate's claim in January, finding his injury did not
meet the "objectively, sufficiently serious" test of prison abuse
case law. "A female prison guard’s solicitation of a male prisoner’s
manual masturbation, even under the threat of reprisal, does not
present more than de minimis injury," the
ruling said.
Barkett questioned "what
rationale the panel uses to support its position:"
Does the panel
opinion stand for the proposition that the sexual abuse of
prisoners is not offensive to contemporary standards of decency
and human dignity? Is the opinion suggesting that the
Constitution permits a “little” sexual abuse?
Her pleas did not move
Judge Edward E. Carnes, to whom the
Eighth Amendment issue was not of "exceptional importance" meriting
en banc review. Boxer X, he noted, can proceed on his Fourth
Amendment privacy claim and "the role of our court system in civil
cases is not to decide how many analytical angels can dance on the
head of a particular injury."
But since when are
plaintiffs barred from seeking recovery against a defendant on more
than one theory? By belittling Boxer X's alleged injury, the 11th Circuit
has truly committed, as Barkett put it, a "precedent-setting error
of exceptional importance."
In Phoenix, you'd better
accept a lunch invitation from attorney David
A. Selden –- or he may file a motion to compel your presence.
Selden, of
Stinson Morrison Hecker, thought a
lunch would be a good way of unblocking some procedural logjams in a
commercial litigation case. "In this day of e-mails and voice mails,
you don't get to the bottom of things," he explains.
After opposing counsel
Dow G. Ostlund (Tiffany & Bosco,
Phoenix) turned him down, Selden filed a "Motion to Compel
Acceptance of Lunch Invitation." Ostlund, who distrusted Selden's
motives, replied by proposing lunch at a Phoenix steakhouse that
isn't open for lunch.
In a jocular July 19
ruling, Maricopa County Superior Court
Judge Pendleton Gaines said he had "rarely seen a motion with
more merit" and ordered the lunch to be conducted by Aug. 18. "There
are a number of fine restaurants within easy driving distance of
both counsel's offices," he suggested.
The lawyers, in fact, beat
the judge to the punch. By the time the ruling was issued, Selden
had hosted Ostlund at his firm's office where they enjoyed a catered
lunch.
"I'll use it for leverage
any chance I get," Selden says of the compelled lunch motion. "It's
another arrow in the litigation quiver."
Major
League Baseball deservedly got grand-slammed in a high-stakes
intellectual property case as a Missouri judge found that the
operator of a fantasy baseball league is entitled to use baseball
players' names and performance statistics without a license.
U.S. Magistrate
Judge Mary Ann L. Medler set a precedent
that not only enables CBC Distribution and
Marketing of St. Louis to keep operating its online leagues,
but also should help shield the entire fantasy sports industry from
publicity rights lawsuits.
"CBC’s
mere use of Major League baseball players’ names in conjunction with
their playing records does not establish a violation of the players’
right of publicity," Medler said in granting summary judgment to CBC
on its claims for declaratory relief.
CBC filed
suit in February 2005 claiming that
Advanced
Media,
the Internet arm of Major League Baseball, was seeking monopoly
control of baseball statistics associated with players' names.
Advanced Media and the players' union countersued for violations of
publicity rights.
More than 15 million
people spend an estimated $1.5 billion a year to play fantasy
sports, and Medler's
opinion shows
that baseball's challenge to CBC was little more than an
opportunistic lunge at that lucrative market.
Addressing
the threshold issue of the case, the judge found none of the
elements of the publicity rights tort apply to CBC's leagues.
Baseball players, she said in her opinion, "do not earn a living by
the publication of their playing record" and "Players' records are
readily available in the public domain."
Medler went on to stress that if the publicity rights of baseball
players trumped the First Amendment, CBC’s "right of freedom
of expression would be totally extinguished." While the defendants
claimed they only objected to the use of players' names,
it would be
meaningless and useless to its game participants for CBC to
report that there were five home runs or ten singles in a
baseball game without identifying the players who hit the home
runs or singles.
CBC lost
only on its claim that its use of names and statistics is
copyrightable and, therefore, copyright law preempts publicity
rights claims.
UPDATE ...
Advanced Media and the Major League Baseball Players Assn. will
appeal the decision. "We continue to believe that the use of the
players, without their consent, to create this type of
commercial venture is improper," they said in a joint
statement.
A federal
judge has thrown out an illegal search case against police officers
who entered a New York City man's apartment without a warrant and
removed his 450-pound Siberian tiger from the premises.
"The word chutzpah ... is
now vastly overused in the legal literature," U.S. District
Judge Sidney H. Stein said. "Yet in a
case such as this ... it is a most appropriate term to use."
Police learned that
Antoine Yates was raising the tiger in
his fifth-floor Harlem residence after receiving an anonymous tip.
Two days earlier, officers had found him near the fifth story
elevators with a deep gash in his leg, but he told them he had been
bitten by a pit bull.
During an Oct. 4, 2003
raid on Yates' apartment, an officer who had rappelled down the side
of the building shot Ming the tiger through a window with a
tranquilizer gun. An alligator named Al was also removed from the
apartment.
Yates, who has admitted
being mauled by Ming and was convicted of reckless endangerment,
showed his chutzpah by suing the city on claims that the
confiscation of his pets violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
Granting the city's motion
for summary judgment, Judge Stein said the officers were immune from
liability because their actions "easily comply with the established
New York standard ... for when an emergency justifies entering a
home without a warrant."
The
opinion also addressed Yates' allegation that officers stole his
pet dwarf rabbit:
The whereabouts of
the rabbit have not been ascertained, but there is no indication
in the record that Al the alligator was questioned in that
regard. The Court suggests that he may be more knowledgeable on
this issue than he has disgorged to date.
Diane
Roney took only two bites out of a Wendy's bacon cheeseburger
before losing her appetite and throwing it in the trash. Given the
outcome of her food-poisoning case against the fast-food chain, she
should have kept it as evidence.
A federal jury took only
30 minutes to decide last week that the burger was not contaminated
with E. coli bacteria and did not cause Roney to become violently
ill. She was admitted to a hospital with kidney failure the day
after sampling the sandwich in March 2001 at a Wendy's restaurant in
Saco, Maine.
Wendy's argued that Roney,
57, fell ill from a possible enzyme deficiency and, if she did have
E. coli, could have been infected by other food she ate or exposure
to schoolchildren who might not have washed their hands after using
the restroom.
"Given all of the
undisputed facts, a reasonable jury could only speculate that the
cheeseburger sandwich was to blame," the company said in a
brief.
Roney claimed she ate a
burger that was so raw it leaked about a spoonful of blood when she
cut it in half. Undercooked meat, particularly hamburger, is
believed to be the most common cause of E. coli infection in the
U.S.
But proving causation is
the major problem for plaintiffs in food-poisoning cases and Roney
barely survived a motion for summary judgment.
In a March
ruling, U.S. Magistrate
Judge Margaret J. Kravnick noted that
Roney's case for causation was "complicated" by the fact that "the
subject bacon cheeseburger was discarded and, hence, could not be
examined for the presence of E. coli bacteria."
Doctors also waited too
long to take a stool or other culture from Roney that could be
tested for E. coli contamination.
"I find this question to
be an extremely close one to call," Kravnick said of the causation
issue before allowing the case to proceed to trial. It obviously
wasn't close for the jury.
A judge has barred the
parents of Natalee Holloway from suing
a Dutch student in New York, possibly leaving them with little
recourse in their quest to solve the disappearance of their
daughter.
"[T]his
court finds that New York is not a convenient forum for litigating
the instant dispute which 'has no discernible connection to New York
but a very substantial nexus to' Aruba,"
Manhattan Supreme Court Judge Barbara R.
Kapnick said in dismissing the parents' suit against
Joran van der Sloot and his father.
Elizabeth
Twitty and Dave Holloway allege
that van der Sloot abducted and sexually assaulted Natalee while she
was on a class trip to Aruba, a Caribbean island. At a hearing in
May, their attorney said the suit was "their
last chance for justice, to find out what happened to their
daughter."
But
Kapnick found the defendants would be inconvenienced if they were
compelled to litigate the case in New York, perhaps by being unable
to subpoena key witnesses, including law enforcement personnel, who
are in Aruba.
The
decision is a big victory for the van der Sloots' high-profile
attorney, Joseph Tacopino, who argued
that the "case belongs in Aruba, period."
"[T]he
courts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, of which Aruba is a
constituent part, have been found to present an appropriate
alternative forum in which to bring suit,"
Kapnick said.
Aruba
may not, however, be much of
an alternative for Natalee's parents.
Because the record was
"insufficiently fermented" when a trial judge found a prosecutor was
not a public official, a federal appeals court has thrown out a
$950,000 libel verdict against the
Boston Phoenix weekly
newspaper.
In awarding the damages to
Marc E. Mandel, a former Maryland
assistant state's attorney, a jury found the Phoenix was negligent in describing him as
a child molester in an article about child custody disputes.
Senior U.S. District
Judge Edward F. Harrington had ruled on
summary judgment that Mandel was a private figure and therefore did
not have to meet the higher actual malice standard that applies to
public official plaintiffs in defamation cases.
Ordering a new trial, the
1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal said
the principle of not drinking wine before its time applies to
summary judgment:
[I]t is a deliciously helpful
device if properly timed, but one that can leave a sour
taste if brought to bear on an
insufficiently fermented record.
The factual record at the summary
judgment stage of Mandel's case "was too uncertain to warrant
a legal conclusion either way about
Mandel's status" under libel law, the
opinion concluded.
The good news for Mandel
is the court found he sufficiently established at trial that the
Phoenix's statements about him were false and the paper failed
to exercise due care in publishing them.
A
Colorado attorney who is also a professional poker player is
claiming in a first-of-its-kind lawsuit that Internet fantasy sports
leagues are "unlawful gambling schemes," but the courts are unlikely
to deal him a winning hand.
Chuck
Humphrey
No state has ever
prosecuted fantasy sports league operators or players for illegal
gambling and three bills recently introduced before Congress that
would prohibit Internet gambling include an exemption for fantasy
sports.
But in a federal
complaint filed in New Jersey, Chuck
Humphrey alleges the operators of the
Sportsline, ESPN, and
TSN leagues receive illegal profits
from the "wagers" that players make when they pay to participate in
the leagues.
Because league winners are
determined by the statistics of actual players in pro sports
leagues, Humphrey contends, "fantasy sports are games of chance."
Just as bettors on horse races cannot control the performance of the
horses,
fantasy sports
contestants lack the ability to accurately predict and control
the performance of their respectively drafted athletes. Thus,
the elements of chance predominate over the elements of skill in
determining the distribution of prizes.
Humphrey, a co-founder of
the Tournament of Champions of Poker who does not play fantasy
sports himself, is suing under a New Jersey law which allows third
parties to
seek recovery of money lost through illegal gambling.
As far as precedent, he
could point to a 1991 Florida attorney general's
opinion. While "It might well be argued that skill is involved
in the selection of a successful fantasy team," the opinion said,
the state's anti-gambling law "prohibits stakes, bets or wagers on
the results of any contests of skill."
Fantasy sports league
entry fees "are used to make up the prizes" and therefore "clearly
appear to qualify as a 'stake, bet or wager' as defined by the
courts," the attorney general concluded.
That opinion, however, has
never been tested in court and, according to one legal
scholar, a due process challenge brought by participants would
be likely to succeed because regulation of fantasy sports leagues
"poses unreasonable infringement on economic liberties."
Humphrey
says "the Internet boom of the late
1990s changed the theretofore predominantly social and entertainment
nature" of fantasy sports.
But it's still fantasy to suggest
players are like gamblers who bet on the outcome of a horse race or
a hand of cards.
Ironically, the pending legislation in Congress does not exempt
online poker from the Internet gambling prohibition.
The case of a California
high-school student barred from wearing an anti-gay t-shirt on
campus has taken an ironic turn as five conservative members of the
9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
accused their most liberal colleague of censorship.
The court's liberal
flag-bearer, Judge Stephen Reinhardt,
wrote for the 2-1 majority in a
controversial April 20
opinion that found the student's sartorial expression of
his views was not protected by the First Amendment. The back of the
t-shirt proclaimed, "Homosexuality Is Shameful."
This week, Reinhardt
returned to the fray, exchanging barbs with conservative
Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, as the
full 9th Circuit announced it would not reconsider the case of
Harper v. Poway Unified School Dist.
In a
dissent signed by four other conservatives, O'Scannlain said the
panel majority had perpetrated an "unprecedented" expansion of the
U.S. Supreme Court's Tinker standard, which limits protections
for student speech.
"[U]nder the panel
majority’s decision, school administrators are now free to give one
side of debatable public questions
a free pass while muzzling voices raised in opposition," O'Scannlain
complained, and
No Supreme Court
decision empowers our public schools to engage in such
censorship.
Reinhardt shot back, saying that "The
dissenters still don’t get the message -- or Tinker!" and
suggesting they are "simply insensitive to the injury that public
scorn and ridicule can cause young minority students."
EDITORIAL COMMENT ...
"Public schools should not be at once assisting an advocacy
group in drawing attention to the plight of gay and lesbian
students and forbidding those with deep religious objections
from wearing a shirt expressing their feelings."
(Washington
Post)
In May, the full 9th
Circuit also voted to deny rehearing of another Reinhardt
decision related to speech in schools. Fields v. Palmdale
School Dist. held that a student survey containing questions
about sexual matters did not violate the right of parents to control
the upbringing of their children.
The
7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals failed to
consider the potentially chilling implications of a decision that
allows employers to make "inquiries into the maturity" of minors
suing them for sexual harassment.
In the case of a
16-year-old ice-cream store worker who had sex with her supervisor,
the court held that consent is not a defense to liability because
the plaintiff was below the age of consent when the alleged
harassment occurred. The supervisor, Matt
Nayman, was convicted of statutory rape.
"Congress may have felt
that to recognize such a defense in a [Title VII] discrimination
case would be 'blaming the victim' with a vengeance,"
Judge Richard A. Posner noted in the
opinion.
But Posner, one of the
country's most eminent judges, went on to say that in the damages
phase of a trial,
Oberweis Dairy "should be permitted to
put Nayman’s conduct in perspective" by arguing contributory
negligence.
The harm suffered by the
plaintiff, identified only as Jane Doe, could be "minimal" if she
was "sneaking around behind her mother’s -- and her employer’s --
back and thus facilitating Nayman’s behavior," Posner said, and
Though inquiries
into the maturity of individual minors are ... bound to be
fraught with uncertainty, a jury should be able to sort out the
difference between an employer’s causal contribution to the
statutory rape by its employee of a 16-year-old siren (if that
turns out to be an accurate description of Doe) and to similar
conduct toward, say, a 12-year-old.
The likely effect of this
ruling, nevertheless, is to open the door to a "blame the victim"
strategy. What's to stop defense counsel from inquiring into the
victim's sexual history to establish whether she is a "siren" or
not?
Posner's suggestion that
Doe may have facilitated or contributed to her abuse is also
disturbing. The criminal law recognizes that those below the age of
consent are too immature to be held accountable for sexual activity
with adults and the victim in a
civil case should have the same protection.
The Bush administration's
effort to squelch cases related to NSA surveillance activities would
have suffered two defeats in less than a week if U.S. District
Judge Matthew F. Kennelly of Chicago
had shown a little more backbone.
Kennelly expressed doubts
about the government's argument that a case filed by the
ACLU on behalf of
AT&T customers should be dismissed under the state secrets
privilege to protect national security.
The plaintiffs, led by
author Studs Terkel, allege AT&T
violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act by providing
records of phone calls to the NSA's super-snoopers.
But in a July 25
opinion, Kennelly held that the case
"implicates the state secrets privilege" and is distinguishable from
Hepting v. AT&T, in which a
San Francisco judge five days earlier found the same privilege does
not apply to a case involving the monitoring of the content of phone
calls.
While U.S. District
Judge Vaughn R. Walker said the
existence of the monitoring program, having been confirmed by
President Bush and others, is "hardly a secret," Kennelly said media
reports about the alleged disclosure of phone call records "amount
to nothing more than unconfirmed speculation."
"[T]he Court is persuaded
that requiring AT&T to confirm or deny whether it has disclosed
large quantities of telephone records to the federal government
could give adversaries of this country valuable insight into the
government’s intelligence activities," Kennelly concluded.
That "unconfirmed
speculation," however, is surely more than enough to convince any
adversary to avoid using AT&T's services, particularly when added to
the confirmation of the monitoring program and the very specific
disclosures by Qwest, another phone
service provider.
According to counsel for
former Qwest CEO Joseph Nacchio, the
government repeatedly approached Nacchio seeking access to phone
records, but he refused after learning that the feds had no legal
authority to support their demands.
Kennelly discounted the
Qwest disclosures because Terkel "concerns AT&T, not any
other telephone companies." But it doesn't take much to infer that
AT&T, the nation's largest provider, was involved in the same
program.
In Hepting,
Walker said "dismissing this case at the outset would
sacrifice liberty for no apparent enhancement of
security." Kennelly should have
steeled his nerves and used that same balancing test to keep Terkel alive.
Claims for negligent
infliction of emotional distress are not limited to those asserted
by bystanders, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
has ruled in the case of a four-year-old boy whose pet dog was
stomped to death by a 13-year-old neighbor.
The teenager allegedly
jumped and landed with both feet on the dog while playing with the
younger boy in Superior, Wisc. Citing the four-year-old's direct
involvement in the incident, a trial court judge refused to let his
family plead a claim for NIED.
But the appeals court said
the judge had interpreted a 1994 precedent too narrowly. In
Bowen v. Lumbermens Mutual,
517 N.W.2d 432, the estate of a boy killed when his bicycle collided
with a vehicle sought damages for the emotional distress he suffered
by being aware of the imminent collision.
"Bowenacknowledged a direct claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, but rejected
that particular claim on public policy grounds,” the appeals court
stressed in
Camp v. Anderson.
Judge Gregory A. Peterson, writing for the court, said the
plaintiffs could not recover damages for the distress the
four-year-old suffered as a bystander to the stomping because a dog
is “property” under the law. The direct claim involves the lurid
allegation that, at one point, the teenager chased the other boy with a
feces-covered cattail.
Today's 5-4 decision of
the Washington state Supreme Court to uphold the state's Defense of
Marriage Act completes a thoroughly miserable month in the courts
for advocates of same-sex marriage.
Since July 6, as the
table below illustrates, five
state high courts and a federal appeals court have ruled against
gays and lesbians who wish to marry. Whatever momentum the same-sex
marriage cause had coming out of a landmark 2003 victory in
Massachusetts has come to a screeching halt.
In Washington state, trial
court judges in King and Thurston Counties had struck down the 1998
law defining marriage as the union between a man and a woman because
it denied the plaintiffs the fundamental right to marry.
But the Supreme Court
found the law constitutional, with the plurality
opinion clinging to the illusion that limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples is reasonably related to promoting procreation
and family stability.
Justice Mary E. Fairhurst chastised the majority in a
dissent, saying they had "condone[d] blatant discrimination ...
in the name of encouraging procreation" and questioning how "giving
same-sex couples the same right that opposite-sex couples enjoy
injure[s] the State’s interest in procreation and healthy child
rearing."
"[T]here is no logical way
that denying the right to marry to same-sex couples will
encourage heterosexual couples to procreate with greater
frequency," she pointed out.
Of
course, there may be little room for logic in the same-sex marriage
arena. And if same-sex marriage advocates lose pending cases in
California and New Jersey, that Massachusetts decision in
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003), will
go down as one of legal history's great anomalies.
The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has given employers a
green light to fire mentally disabled employees for workplace
misconduct even if the disability caused the misconduct.
"[A]n employer does not
violate [state discrimination law] by terminating an employee for
egregious misconduct stemming from any recognized handicap (as
opposed to termination for the handicap itself)," the court said in
the case of a former Harvard University
employee who has bipolar disorder.
The school fired
Michael Mammone from his position as a
Peabody Museum staff assistant after he verbally abused
administrators while suffering an episode of mania.
Under the earlier
precedent of Garrity v. United Airlines,
421 Mass. 55 (1995), a handicapped employee who engages in
egregious workplace misconduct can be held to the same standard as a
nonhandicapped employee who engages in
similar misconduct.
Mammone argued that Garrity
applies only to misconduct resulting from drug or alcohol
dependence. But Justice Robert J. Cordy,
writing for a 5-1 majority, refused to create "significantly
different levels of disqualifying disability-related
misconduct based on whether the misconduct stems
from alcoholism or some other
disability."
The
opinion affirmed a trial judge's summary dismissal of Mammone's
claims that he was terminated because of his disability.
In a dissent,
Justice John M. Greaney said a
reasonable jury could conclude that
the conduct for
which the plaintiff was terminated was not "egregious
misconduct," but rather a manifestation of his bipolar disorder,
an illness over which he had no control and which was aggravated
by confrontational treatment by a supervisor
who should have known better.
"The court's decision will
make life even more difficult for those attempting to hold down a
job while suffering with a mental
illness," Greaney warned.
The
9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals recently took a more humane
approach to a similar issue in
Dark v. Curry County, which reversed summary dismissal of
the case of an Oregon truck driver who was fired after suffering an
epileptic seizure on the job.
"[W]ith few exceptions,
conduct resulting from a disability is considered
to be part of the disability,
rather than a separate basis for termination," the court said,
quoting from its earlier decision in Humphrey v. Mem’l
Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128 (2001).
Groups including the
National Disability Rights Network
supported Mammone. If the Garrity ruleapplies to his
case, they said in an
amicus brief, "individuals with mental health disorders ... will
be vulnerable to irrational prejudice harbored by their employers."
An aspiring screenwriter
who lost some of his work when a phone company technician installed
DSL on his computer will net only $27,000 in damages after a
California appeals court ruled he was negligent in failing to back
up and protect his data.
A jury awarded
Nicholas Boyd $60,000 in compensatory
damages and $33,000 in punitives, finding the
SBC technician negligently deleted files from his computer
during the installation. A data recovery specialist was unable to
recover entire drafts of two of his screenplays.
Boyd argued on appeal that
the compensatory award was insufficient, particularly as a German
production company had agreed to pay him $2.7 million for three
scripts, and he was entitled to 100 percent of the award. The jury
decided he was 55 percent at fault for his losses.
But in an unpublished
opinion, the 2nd District Court of Appeal
affirmed the award and said the jury's finding of contributory
negligence was reasonable.
The plaintiff, who
admitted backing up one script on a floppy disk, "could have easily
backed up his other work on floppy disk, but he neglected to do so,"
the court noted.
Worse still for Boyd, the
panel tossed the punitives award, ruling that "The jury’s finding of
fraud, oppression or malice was not permissible."
In a highly technical
reading of a jurisdictional issue, a federal appeals court has found
that an Oklahoma Supreme Court justice who accused his colleagues of
age discrimination does not have a remediable injury.
Marian R. Opala filed his unusual suit in order to undo the
result of the court's November 2004 election for chief justice. The
incumbent, Joseph M. Watt, was
reelected to another two-year term after the court changed the
eligibility rule.
Under Ex Parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908), state officials are not immune from being sued
in federal court if, among other things, the plaintiff is seeking
prospective –- not retroactive -– injunctive relief.
Opala said that exception
to sovereign immunity applied to his case against his eight
colleagues because he was seeking to end an "ongoing violation" of
his rights
by reinstating the old rule.
U.S. District Judge Clarence A. Brimmer
last year denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. But the
10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said
his analysis of the jurisdictional issue was "incomplete" and
threw out the case.
"Any
remedy the federal courts could fashion would not redress Justice
Opala’s injury," the
opinion said, because a declaration that the new eligibility
rule is unconstitutional "would not
place Justice Opala in the position
he was in on November 3, 2004."
At the time of the
election, Opala was vice-chief justice and, under the old rule,
would have been first in line for chief.
"There is no
prospective remedy that can unring
that bell," the court concluded.
Opala did not attend the
meeting at which the other justices adopted the rule change and duly
voted for Watt, choosing to sit it out in protest.
The logic of the 10th
Circuit's decision is Opala should have sued for an injunction blocking
the vote. But it is unclear how he could have done that under the
circumstances.
Immigrants rights
activists might need to adjust their legal strategy after an Arizona
jury found that alleged border vigilante Roger
Barnett did not trespass on a neighbor's property while he
detained a group of Mexican migrants.
The Tucson-based
Border Action Network (BAN), which
accuses Barnett of mistreating immigrants he has rounded up on his
Cochise County ranch since the late 1990s, has helped bring lawsuits
against the rancher in state and federal court.
In the first case to go to
trial, Donald Mackenzie, manager of the
Wind Tree Ranch, alleged that in October 2003 he found three armed
individuals dressed as Border Patrol agents with about 30 migrants
at the water well on his property. He realized only later that he
had, in fact, encountered Barnett, his brother Donald and wife
Barbara.
"[The Barnetts] came to
the well to keep and capture prey, and nobody allowed them to be
there for that purpose," plaintiff's counsel
Jesus Romo Véjar, who is affiliated with BAN, said in his
closing argument.
But it took a Cochise
County Superior jury only 15 minutes to reach a verdict in favor of
the Barnetts, who claimed they were dressed as civilians and denied
that they captured the migrants at the well.
Jurors said immigration
politics did not influence their decision. But Donald Barnett's
lawyer certainly played the immigration card when he told the jury
that people like Mackenzie who put out water stations might be
encouraging migrants to cross the border illegally.
Romo Véjar, moreover, may
have erred in not seeking a change in venue from Cochise County,
where immigration is such a hot-button issue and Barnett has plenty
of sympathizers.
"All you need is a couple
of sympathetic people on the jury and you’re dead," a former Arizona
judge told the Sierra Vista Herald.
In a second BAN-supported
case set for trial in October, a Cochise County man alleges Barnett
threatened him and his young daughters with an assault rifle after
accusing them of trespassing on his land.
The plaintiffs, BAN says
on its
Web site, will "take the stand to talk about the nightmares,
fears and damage caused by the Barnett brothers" and "expect that
lessons learned from the Mackenzie trial will help justice stand up
against outrageous vigilante activities on the border."
One of those lessons might
be to get the trial out of Cochise County.
A
Pittsburgh attorney likely will get nowhere with his libel suit
against the operator of DontDateHimGirl.com
because the derogatory comments about him in its online forum were
posted by third parties.
Todd J. Hollis' complaint alleges
that as the owner and operator of the site,
Tasha Joseph had a duty to "properly investigate the subject
matter of the defamatory statements prior to publishing them."
UPDATE ...
Joseph has
moved for dismissal of the case,
citing the protections of the Communications Decency Act.
DontDateHimGirl
promotes itself as a site that "lets women publicly out the men who
allegedly cheat on them." The anonymous comments about Hollis ranged
from "he's a DOG" and "Often dresses shabbily for a lawyer" to "He
gave me an STD" and "His crib is a dump."
Joseph ''has created a
very malicious communications medium,'' plaintiff's counsel told the
Miami
Herald. "She has to know what it has become -- that it
is being used for vindictive purposes."
But the defense will
certainly argue that Joseph is protected under the federal
Communications Decency Act, which applies broadly to Internet
content providers who do not exercise editorial control over
third-party postings.
As additional
anti-libel insurance, DontDateHimGirl identifies each man in its
database as an "alleged" cheater and, in a block of flashing text,
invites men to "tell us your side of the story."
EDITORIAL COMMENT ...
"Suing is one thing in the case of the Mt. Lebanon [Pa.] teen-ager who
is described in the vilest of sexual terms in a 'Top 25' list
that was e-mailed and distributed directly to her friends and
acquaintances. But suing for defamation by a 38-year-old man
portrayed in much tamer terms on a Web site makes the lawyer
look as ridiculous as the descriptions of him on the Web site."
(Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette)
A sharply divided
California Supreme Court today opened
what a dissenter called "a Pandora's box" in r
ecognizing
the tort of negligent transmission of HIV.
A 4-3 majority of the
court found liability for infecting a sexual partner extends not
only to someone who knows he has the virus, but also "to
those situations where the actor, under the totality of
circumstances, has reason to know of the infection."
Under that "constructive
knowledge" standard, the plurality
opinion of Justice Marvin R. Baxter
said, an HIV-positive woman identified as Bridget B. who claims she
was infected by her husband is entitled to question him about
whether he engaged in unprotected, extra-marital sex and had
symptoms consistent with HIV infection.
But two justices argued
strongly in favor of limiting liability to cases of actual
knowledge, with Justice Carlos R. Moreno
slamming the majority for ignoring the unique context of HIV and
"rushing into the complex terrain that constitutes AIDS policy."
The "novel cause of action
for transmission of HIV based on a constructive knowledge standard,"
he warned in his dissent,
potentially
licenses invasions into the sexual privacy of all sexually
active Californians and may even invite abuse of the judicial
process ... [W]ith this decision the majority has opened a
Pandora’s box.
In a concurrence,
Justice Joyce L. Kennard saw "no need
to decide the level of knowledge necessary to trigger the tort
duty," saying the "ordinary test of relevance" was applicable to
discovery in the case.
Bridget B. tested positive
for HIV in October 2000, only three months after marrying John B.
The Supreme Court majority limited discovery to the six-month period
preceding August 2000, when John B. tested negative, because the
latency period for development of HIV antibodies is believed to be
no longer than six months.
ON POINT shares
Moreno's concern that constructive knowledge is simply too loose and
vague a standard to apply to such a sensitive area as HIV infection.
The following table shows how the seven justices
split on the appropriate standard for the tort of negligent
transmission of HIV:
Justice
Actual Knowledge
Constructive Knowledge
Quote
Marvin Baxter
Yes
Yes
"[T]he tort of
negligent transmission of HIV does not depend solely on
actual knowledge of HIV infection and would extend at least
to those situations where the actor, under the totality of
the circumstances, has reason to know of the
infection."
Ming Chin
Yes
Yes
Carol Corrigan
Yes
Yes
Ronald George
Yes
Yes
Joyce Kennard
No
No
"I see no
need to decide the level of knowledge necessary to trigger
the tort duty."
Carlos Moreno
Yes
No
"This cause
of action potentially licenses invasions into the sexual
privacy of all sexually active Californians."
Kathryn Werdegar
Yes
No
"[T]his court
is ill equipped and ill advised to venture into an area the
Legislature already has extensively addressed."
Marlon Brando was "incapable of signing anything" on the day
he changed his will and gave control of his $22 million estate to
former movie studio chief Mike Medavoy
and two other executors, Brando's caregiver alleges in an explosive fraud
complaint.
Angela Borlaza says she was present when accountant
Larry Dressler and attorney
Charles A. Larson came to Brando's
Beverly Hills home on June 18, 2004 –- less than two weeks before
the Hollywood legend died. The visitors "told [Borlaza] they were
there to change the will," the Los Angeles County Superior Court
complaint says.
In a
codicil to the will which
bears Brando's signature, he removed longtime retainers
Jo An Corrales and
Alice Marshak as his executors,
replacing them with Medavoy, Dressler (who is Medavoy's
brother-in-law), and Avra Douglas (a
friend of Brando's daughter Rebecca).
But according to Borlaza,
Brando was "incapacitated, confused, medicated and non-communicative
at the time of the alleged signing ceremony" and she never saw him
sign any documents. Moreover, having been trained by Brando to
recognize his signature, Borlaza "is informed and believes" that he
did not sign the codicil on June 18, 2004.
Brando apparently used a
"secret code" to authenticate his signature, placing "certain dots
(.....) between various letters of his name" when signing documents.
The "Marlon Brando Sr"
signature on the Aug. 28, 2002 will shows dots inside the "B" and
the "S"; the equivalent signature on the codicil does not.
Brando "lacked the mental
capacity required to understand what was transpiring at his
residence on June 18, 2004," Borlaza insists.
The plaintiff, who started
working for Brando as a cook in 1995, claims that as a result of the
change in executors, she was defrauded out of a San Fernando Valley
house that Brando had bought for her.
Brando's holding company
had title to the home, but, Borlaza says, Corrales knew it was
rightfully hers and
had Corrales been
allowed to serve as the executor of the Decedent's estate and
had a fraud not been perpetrated on the Creditors,
Beneficiaries, Interested Parties and the Court, as a result of
the offering of the June 18, 2004 codicil into probate, title to
the property would have been transferred into the Plaintiff's
name by Corrales.
Since Brando's death, the
executors, represented by Larson, have sold off many of his assets.
Most controversially, they made a $2-million deal with a
Tahiti-based businessman who plans to develop Brando's beloved South
Pacific island, Tetiaroa, as an "eco-resort."
Brando "had a large estate
and being in control of his estate was and is a prestigious job and
valuable job," Borlaza's suit says, alleging that the executors
"have received and will continue to receive, for years to come,
substantial financial gain for controlling the Marlon Brando
empire."
In its
latest assault on civil rights, the
U.S.
Supreme Court
has given the green light to prison officials to impose even the
most draconian of restrictions on inmates in the name of the
deprivation theory of rehabilitation.
Under
Turner v. Staley, 482 U.S. 78
(1987), restrictive prison rules are permissible if they are
"'reasonably related' to legitimate penological interests" and are
not an "exaggerated response" to such objectives.
But a majority of the High Court
made what a dissenter called only a "peremptory" effort to apply
that test to a rule forbidding "worst of the worst" inmates in
Pennsylvania's Long Term Segregation Unit (LTSU) all access
to newspapers, magazines, and photographs.
Summarily
dismissing the challenge of an inmate, the plurality
opinion authored by "liberal"
Justice
Stephen G. Breyer
abjectly deferred to a prison official's "professional judgment that
the Policy deprived 'particularly difficult' inmates of a last
remaining privilege and that doing so created a significant
behavioral incentive."
In a
dissent,
Justice
John Paul Stevens
noted the complete lack of evidence that the deprivation theory of
behavior modification "has any basis in human psychology, or that
the challenged rule has in fact had any rehabilitative effect on
LTSU inmates."
"
[T]he
rule comes perilously close to a state-sponsored effort at mind
control," he concluded.
Behavior
modification "could be recited,
routinely, to immunize all manner of prison regulations from review
for rationality," agreed
Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
in the other dissent.
The ruling
basically leaves the First Amendment rights of inmates protected in
only one area. Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), prison regulations that impact freedom of
religion are subject to the heightened strict scrutiny standard of
review.
The shadow of RLUIPA explains why
prison officials allow LTSU inmates to receive The Jewish Daily
Forward, which is deemed to be a religious publication, and not
the Christian Science Monitor.
But
doesn't an inmate's right to have personal photographs deserve as
much protection as the right to read religious literature? As
Stevens put it,
[T]he
ban on personal photographs, for at least some inmates,
interferes with the capacity to remember loved ones, which is
undoubtedly a core part of a person’s “sphere of intellect and
spirit.”
Celia and Jesus Escalante spent 45 minutes trapped in an
elevator with a dead man on its roof. Now they could be stuck
without a legal remedy for the emotional distress of their ordeal.
The Tucson, Ariz., couple
were stranded after the descending elevator car they were riding in
a Pima County office building struck and killed an elevator mechanic
in June 2004. David Woodrow, who had
been peering into the open shaft, landed on top of the car.
The Escalantes' ordeal
turned into something out of an Edgar Allan Poe story. "[T]hey
observed blood sipping [sic] into the elevator and covering part of
the walls of the elevator," they allege in a negligence suit against
Otis Elevator Co.
As a result of the gory
experience, the complaint says, the
plaintiffs have suffered a "great amount of anguish, trauma and
stress." But Arizona law is unclear as to whether they can recover
for negligent infliction of emotional distress absent physical
injury or illness.
In
a case arising out of exposure to
asbestos, Division One of the Arizona Court of
Appeals denied an emotional distress claim, finding "no
evidence tending to establish the existence of any physical harm or
medically identifiable effect." Destories v. City of
Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705 (1987).
But Division Two upheld a
$1.5 million jury award to a man who was incorrectly treated for an
elevated red blood cell count with a radioactive drug. The patient's
treatment, the court said in Monaco v. Healthpartners of Southern
Arizona,
995 P.2d 735 (1999),
resulted in substantial,
long-term emotional disturbances sufficient to support the claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Two elevator trauma cases
suggest the Escalantes may not be able to satisfy the Monaco
standard:
In Bass v. Nooney,
646 S.W.2d 765 (1983), the Missouri
Supreme Court expressed doubt as to whether "an ordinary
person normally constituted would succumb to serious emotional
distress by reason of being trapped in a stalled elevator."
In Lewis v.
Westinghouse Electric, 487 N.E.2d 1071 (1985), the
Illinois Court of Appeals said a
woman trapped in an elevator for 40 minutes "did not have a
reasonable fear for her own safety."
The plaintiffs in those
lawsuits, however, were not trapped in an elevator with blood
leaking through the roof.
A coastal property owner
won a landmark victory today as a California appeals court ruled
that the state could not require him to accommodate "the occasional
boater's 'right to a view'" of the shoreline.
The state Coastal
Commission had no authority to impose development conditions on the
landowner in order to protect offshore vantage points, the
2nd District Court of Appeal said in a
case of first impression. Dennis Schneider
wants to build a 10,000-square-foot bluff-top home in San Luis
Obispo County.
The California Coastal Act
protects "views to and along the ocean and scenic coastal areas." In
June 2005, a trial court judge said limiting the reach of the law to
onshore vantage points defies common sense and that "the beauty of a
sunrise from a vantage point offshore is afforded the same
protection as a sunset seen from land."
But the appeals court
showed no such aesthetic refinement in refusing to subordinate "a
landowner's real property rights to the occasional boater's 'right
to a view' of the coastline."
Interpreting the statute
to include views from the ocean "stretches the fabric too thin," the
opinion said, concluding that it applies only to "land-based
scenic views from public parks, trails, roads and vista points."
Schneider wanted the court
to reinstate the original permit that the county issued him in 2000.
The 2nd District would not go that far, ordering the commission to
"rehear the matter consistent with this opinion."
Taking the low-profile
way out of a tawdry legal mess, actor Nick
Nolte has reached a settlement with a teenage girl who was
sexually assaulted during a party at his Malibu estate.
A judge's decision
last month to deny Nolte summary judgment on the girl's premises
liability claims had left the star facing the unappetizing prospect
of a high-profile trial which was scheduled to start July 3.
Court records show the
Jane Doe plaintiff was hoping to introduce evidence of Nolte's own
drug-related run-ins with the law to support her case. His son
Brawley was a co-defendant, accused, among other things, of filming
the victim performing a sex act.
The elder Nolte was
not present at the January 2003 party where a guest, Nicholas
Woodring, committed the sexual assault.
In the summary judgment motion, the defense
argued that the plaintiff's
"own alleged intoxication"
was the proximate cause of her injuries. Jane Doe, however, blamed
Nolte for "creat[ing] an attractive dangerous condition" by allowing
minors to use alcohol and drugs on his premises.
In a sequel to one of the
all-time great probate battles, a former gas station operator is
alleging that a "shirt-tail relative" and a top aide of
Howard Hughes conned him out of a $156
million share of the reclusive billionaire's estate.
Hughes supposedly wrote a
will naming Melvin Dummar as a
beneficiary a few months after Dummar found him lying face down on a
Nevada desert road in late December 1967, woke him up and then drove
him 160 miles to Las Vegas.
But a jury denied Dummar's
probate claim in 1978, ruling the so-called Mormon will was a fake.
A cousin of Hughes, William Lummis,
became the sole beneficiary after Hughes was declared intestate.
Now Dummar, 61, has come
back for a second brush with fame –- or folly. In a federal suit
filed in Utah, he claims Lummis and Frank Gay,
former head of Hughes's holding company, fraudulently deprived him
of a fair trial and his "rightful inheritance."
"[I]n perpetrating the
fraud," the complaint says, the defendants
pressured Hughes employees to testify falsely that "Hughes never
left his penthouse suite at The Desert Inn [in Las Vegas] during the
time period between Christmas and New Year's Eve of 1967."
In fact, Dummar claims,
Hughes flew to central Nevada during that time for the "sexual
services of a female prostitute" at the Cottontail Ranch brothel.
"Mr. Hughes was found by Plaintiff Dummar at a location within miles
of the brothel," the suit says.
The bordello evidence
apparently came to light in 2004 when Hughes's pilot,
Robert Deiro, contacted Dummar. Deiro
has said he flew Hughes to the Cottontail for a regular tryst with a
diamond-toothed redhead and returned to Las Vegas without him.
"The ongoing
effectiveness" of non-disclosure agreements had previously made it
impossible to confirm Dummar's rescue story, the plaintiff says.
Dummar seeks not only the
$156 million claim plus interest, but also triple damages for RICO
violations. But even if Deiro is credible and Melvin really did save
Howard, that may not be enough to prove that the Mormon will is
authentic.
The Bush administration
has plumbed new depths of absurdity by asserting a "reasonable
terrorist" standard in seeking the dismissal of an electronic
privacy suit on state secrets grounds.
At a hearing last week
in San Francisco, Chief U.S. District Judge
Vaughn R. Walker honed in on a key issue in the proposed
class action
which alleges AT&T invaded customers'
privacy by allowing the NSA to monitor phone and data traffic.
How would litigation of
the case damage national security, Vaughn reasonably wondered, if
the alleged cooperation of AT&T and other telecom companies in
warrantless surveillance has been widely reported in the press?
Assistant Attorney
General Peter Keisler responded with
the tired line that public confirmation or denial of AT&T's
involvement would allow terrorists to replace suspicion with
certainty.
A "reasonable terrorist"
deciding how to contact cohorts weighs the risk that
communications on a commercial network will be intercepted
against the difficulties of finding other channels, Keisler
said. By clarifying AT&T's status, he said, "you are enabling
them to communicate more securely and more efficiently."
So now our enemies in the so-called War on Terror -- who are, by
definition, totally unreasonable when they kill and maim -- morph
into "reasonable terrorists" when they contemplate how to
communicate with each other.
Hopefully, none of this nonsense will sway Judge Walker. In an
order
before the hearing, he indicated some skepticism with the
government's position.
"If this litigation reveals
that AT&T has received a certification and is involved in some kind
of surveillance program," he asked, "might the risk to national
security of disclosure of the certification be de minimis and
not outweigh plaintiffs’ due process rights?"
The
1st U.S Circuit Court of Appeals is continuing to add to its
list of plaintiffs who have run afoul of the statute of limitations
in cases resulting from corrupt ties between organized crime and the
FBI's Boston office.
The latest plaintiffs to
be timed out of recovering damages from the feds for civil-rights
violations are two women whose father, Edward
“Teddy” Deegan, was the victim of a mob hit in 1965.
Catherine Deegan Patterson and her sister
Yvonne Deegan Gioka filed an
administrative claim in December 2003. That put them outside the
two-year statute of limitations, assuming their claims accrued with
the publication of a BostonGlobe article.
The newspaper
disclosed in December 2000 that FBI agents were told about the plot
to kill Deegan two days before the murder but did nothing to stop
it. The hitmen -- Vincent Flemmi and
Joseph Barboza –- were both FBI
informants at the time.
The plaintiffs argued that
the statute should toll because the publicity about the case was
centered mainly in the Boston area. Gioka lives in Georgia.
But the 1st Circuit said the
plaintiffs had "constructive knowledge" of the publicity, noting
that the Boston stories were picked up by national media. "[T]he
fact that Gioka resided in Georgia in December 2000-January
2001 is insufficient to vitiate a finding that she should have
learned of the news at that time,"
the
opinion said.
In March, the same court
dismissed as time-barred the claims of a couple who alleged that the
FBI sheltered two notorious Boston mobsters who extorted ownership
of a liquor store from them. James "Whitey"
Bulger, boss of the Winter Hill Gang, and associate
Stephen Flemmi, Vincent's brother, were
also informants.
All the
civil suits related to the FBI/mob scandal have faced a similar
problem -– the feds' involvement in the underlying crime was not
disclosed until many years after the event. As the
table below illustrates, only
one case has avoided being dismissed under the statute of
limitations by the 1st Circuit.
California lawmakers
wasted little time in reacting to the shock electoral defeat of an
incumbent judge by an attorney who had been on "inactive" status
while running a bagel store.
Under current law,
attorneys seeking a judgeship need only be members of the Bar for
the 10 years preceding their selection. Assembly Bill 2519, as
amended this week, requires that they have at least 10 years as
an active member.
On June 6,
businesswoman Lynn D. Olson defeated
Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Dmitra
Janavs, becoming the first challenger to oust an incumbent
jurist in a countywide election in 18 years.
While Olson was admitted to the Bar in 1989, she had been on
active status for only 6-1/2 years.
Despite the election
result, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger kept
Janavs on the bench by appointing her to a vacant judgeship.
The
Missouri Court of Appeals clearly
overstepped the First Amendment line in questioning whether a comic
book author had "artistic motivations" when he named a character for a
professional hockey player.
Todd
McFarlane, author of the "Spawn" series, lost his appeal of a
$15 million jury award as the court found he infringed on the
publicity rights of former NHL enforcer Tony
Twist. He claimed the First Amendment protected his use of
Twist's name for a gangster character.
"The predominant purpose
of the use of the name 'Tony Twist' was to sell comic books and
related products and not to make an expressive comment about Twist
the hockey player," the
opinion authored by Chief Judge Glenn A.
Norton concluded.
The court reached this
conclusion after finding that the evidence that McFarlane
"used Twist's name and
identity to gain a commercial advantage"
outweighed the
"testimony tending to show
that use of the name had an 'expressive component.'"
In the latter regard,
McFarlane testified that he was inspired by a gangster enforcer from
the 1940s nicknamed Kid Twist and another comic book author who used
alliteration in naming characters.
According to Norton, "the
timing of McFarlane's claims of artistic motivation is suspicious."
Before the filing of the suit, the judge stressed, the author
"stated only that the character 'Tony Twist' was named after the
hockey player with the same name."
But judges are not literary
critics and Norton should never have been probing into McFarlane's
motives in the first place. As blogmeister
Prof. Eugene Volokh says in an
amicus brief related to
the case,
First Amendment law
does not allow judges and juries to compare the relative weight
of the literary and commercial value of a discrete passage or
reference in a work.
25 Cal. 4th 387 (2001),
in which the
California Supreme Court found that a work is protected if
its value "does not derive primarily from the celebrity’s fame."
The Missouri Supreme Court has
previously
ruled that Twist has a valid publicity rights claim. That leaves
the U.S. Supreme Court as McFarlane's best hope for overturning an
egregious verdict.
A college student injured
when football fans tore down a goalpost cannot use the venerable
"Hand rule" of negligence to recover damages from the manufacturer
of the equipment, the 7th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled.
Andrew Bourne claimed in a products liability suit that
Gilman Gear was negligent in designing
the aluminum goalpost which snapped and fell on him at a Ball State
University game in October 2001, leaving him a paraplegic. Fans
ripped the post down as part of a victory celebration.
Under
Judge Learned
Hand's classic formula, Gilman would be liable if its burden
(B) of taking precautions was less than the probability (P) of loss
and the gravity (G) of loss –- or, in other words, a reasonable
alternative design of the goalpost could have prevented Bourne's
injuries for less than the cost of those injuries.
But the 7th Circuit
refused to let Bourne argue B < PL to a jury, finding
he had not presented sufficient evidence that the actual design of
the goalpost was defective.
The mere fact that other
manufacturers reputedly sell a safer product, the court said in
affirming a summary dismissal of the case, "is not sufficient to
establish liability."
"Otherwise,"
the
opinion added wryly, "the bare fact of a Volvo would render
every KIA defective."
Plaintiffs
seeking at least $30 million in damages in the first MySpace
seduction lawsuit
must somehow show that the popular Web site
has a duty to protect underage users of its social network from
adult sexual predators.
The suit, filed this week
in Travis County (Texas) District Court, alleges that the failure of
MySpace to prevent strangers from contacting users younger than 16
proximately caused the sexual assault of plaintiff Julie Doe, a
14-year-old girl.
According to the
petition, Pete Solis,
19, assaulted the teenager in an Austin parking lot May 12, about a
month after first contacting her on MySpace where she had a user
profile. He had allegedly misrepresented himself to her as a
high-school senior.
As their theory of
liability, the teen and her mother claim MySpace promoted the site
to children –- about 22 percent of visitors are minors -– and
"expressly and implicitly represented that their website was safe
for young underage users."
Yet despite knowing of
other sexual assaults involving underage users, the suit says,
MySpace failed in its duty to
institute and
enforce appropriate security measures and policies that would
substantially decrease the likelihood of danger and harm that
MySpace posed to [Julie Doe].
In the only somewhat
analogous case, a California
teenager sued America Online last year,
claiming the Internet provider was liable for the behavior of a
chat-room monitor who solicited sexual favors from her.
The question of duty in
that case, which settled before any litigation of the merits, was
clearer since the alleged seducer was an employee of the service
provider and AOL monitored the chat-room communications.
MySpace, on the other
hand, is an "open forum" and had no control over the behavior of
Solis. Suing MySpace for negligence is "like blaming the post office
for the anthrax scare," says Oliver Taillieu,
plaintiff's attorney in the AOL case.
Even if Julie Doe does
establish that MySpace should have tighter security, another tricky
issue is whether its duty extends to what users do away from its
"place for friends."
As a legal expert told the
Austin American-Statesman,
"If you interact on MySpace, you are safe, but if a 13-year-old or
14-year-old goes out in person and meets someone she doesn't know,
that is always an unsafe endeavor."
UPDATE ...
Defense counsel for accused predator Solis says he will file a
cross-complaint against MySpace. "Meeting on MySpace -— if that
alone is enough, then we can make the same claim for damages,"
Adam Reposa tells
TIME magazine.
Federal courts in Utah and
Nebraska are considering highly-charged cases that focus on how to
balance state power with the right of parents to make medical care
decisions for their children.
The Utah case involves
what U.S. District Judge Paul G. Cassell
called the "months-long ordeal" of a couple who clashed with state
officials and doctors over the treatment of their son after he was
diagnosed with a rare form of cancer.
Barbara and Daren Jensen refused
to let the boy undergo radical chemotherapy unless a genetic test
confirmed he had Ewing's sarcoma.
Parker
Jensen
Alleging child neglect, the state
began a juvenile court proceeding to remove
Parker Jensen from his parents' custody.
In a June 16
ruling, Cassell said the Jensens could
proceed with civil-rights claims against two doctors who allegedly
misrepresented Parker's condition to the juvenile court, refused to
order tests that would have conclusively identified his cancer, and
ignored evidence that was inconsistent with their diagnosis.
The right of parents to
direct their child's medical care, Cassell noted, is a "fundamental
liberty interest" and therefore the state can only infringe on that
right "if the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest."
The doctors cannot pass
that strict level of scrutiny on a motion to dismiss, the judge
concluded, since "There is no compelling state interest in
falsifying or misrepresenting evidence to a juvenile court."
In Nebraska, a couple who
claim to be Scientologists want that same high standard applied to
their challenge to the state's infant genetic testing law.
The state requires that
infants be tested for certain metabolic disorders within 24 to 48
hours of birth. Unlike other states, Nebraska allows courts to force
parents to submit their children to testing.
Louise and Ray Spiering have
moved for summary judgment in their suit against the state,
contending the statute violates their religious freedom and parental
rights and should be subjected to strict scrutiny.
"Absent an 'immediate and
substantial threat' to a child’s well-being, the state lacks a
compelling governmental interest in superseding parental decisions
concerning the medical care and treatment of their children," the
motion says.
The Spierings' chances of
prevailing, however, look bleak since the
Nebraska Supreme Court has upheld the law as constitutional
under the less onerous "rational basis" standard.
The U.S. Supreme Court
"has never held that parental rights to childrearing as guaranteed
under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment must be subjected
to a strict scrutiny analysis," the court observed in
Douglas County v. Anaya,
694 N.W.2d 601 (2005).
In
what may be one of the largest verdicts of its kind, a Virginia jury
awarded $2 million to the family of a four-year-old boy who was run
over and killed by a lawn mower at his daycare center.
The daycare operator's
husband drove the MTD Products mower
over Justin Simmons as it rolled
backwards on an incline. The blades kept cutting because
Orvil Reedy had his foot on the clutch.
MTD, the world's largest
mower manufacturer, had equipped the 1988 model with a device that
prevents the blades from turning when in reverse gear. But the
Roanoke Circuit Court jury found the company liable for not
addressing the danger of a mower inadvertently rolling backward with
the clutch depressed.
UPDATE ...
A
Kentucky man has sued
Deere & Co., alleging it is liable for injuries suffered by his
seven-year-old daughter when he backed over her in a mower that
was not equipped with a "no-mow-in-reverse" safety feature. Phillips v. Deere & Co.
The award includes $1
million to Simmons' three-year-old brother and $500,000 to each of
his parents. The plaintiffs dropped Reedy and his wife from the case
during the trial, leaving MTD as the only defendant.
Defense attorney
John Fitzpatrick called the verdict
"nonsense," noting that no mower is designed to automatically stop
its blades when it rolls backward. "No one has even suggested that
as a standard," he told the Roanoke
Times.
MTD also argued that the
bad judgment of the Reedys was to blame for the tragedy.
Roberta Reedy was changing another
child's diaper inside her house when the accident happened and her
husband had never read the manual for the mower, which instructs
users not to depress the clutch while going backwards.
But an unidentified juror
strongly defended the verdict on an online
message board:
In 1974, MTD knew there was
a problem with rollovers and small children ... They also
admitted that they could have designed a safety feature that
would stop the blades when the mower rolled back.
Prevailing industry
standards, moreover, are not necessarily a defense to a products
liability claim if the plaintiff presents evidence there was a
cost-effective alternative design that would have prevented the risk
of injury.
According to a safety
advocacy group, a ride-on mower backs over an average of one young
child a day in the U.S. But as the table
below illustrates, the results of cases involving such accidents
have been very variable.
The
Simmonses' attorney has said a settlement with the Reedys is likely.
A
James Joyce scholar's lawsuit against
the estate of the writer could be a milestone in the development of
an affirmative defense to copyright infringement that is gaining
favor in the courts.
The
U.S. Supreme Court has yet to extend
the doctrine of "patent misuse" to copyright law, but
Carol Loeb Shloss, the author of a book
about Joyce's mentally ill sister, pleads "copyright misuse" in a
declaratory relief action filed earlier this week.
Stephen Joyce
Joyce's grandson and only
living descendant, Stephen Joyce, has
threatened Loeb Shloss with a copyright suit if she publishes an
online supplement to "Lucia Joyce: To Dance in the Wake." The
supplement would include material from James Joyce's published works
and his published and unpublished correspondence.
Loeb Shloss, a professor
of English at Stanford University, claims the fair use doctrine
covers the material. More innovatively, she also contends in her
complaint that the estate "cannot assert copyrights they
control" because
Defendants have repeatedly
misused their control of copyrights in Joyce's work in an effort
to prevent the publication of materials and information about
Joyce or the Joyce family over which Defendants have no rights
or control.
Misuse does not invalidate
a copyright or patent, but "precludes its enforcement during the
period of misuse." In copyright cases, misuse has usually been
applied to anticompetitive behavior.
But in Video
Pipeline v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment,
342 F.3d 191 (2003),
the
3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the "'ultimate
aim' of copyright law is 'to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public
good.'" Misuse could therefore apply to a "copyright holder’s
attempt to restrict expression."
7th
Circuit luminary Judge Richard A. Posner
has also
suggested that "copyright overclaiming" should be deemed "a form
of copyright misuse, which could result in forfeiture of the
copyright."
The plaintiff in Video
Pipeline, a distributor of movie trailers, wasn't successful
with the misuse defense and there's no precedent for applying it to
scholarly creativity. But Loeb Shloss could point to a 2nd Circuit
case which held under the "unclean hands" doctrine that
Howard Hughes could not stop
publication of an unauthorized biography.
"The spirit of the First
Amendment applies to the copyright laws at least to the extent that
the courts should not tolerate any attempted interference with the
public’s right to be informed regarding matters of
general interest," a concurring
opinion said in Rosemont Enters. v. Random House,
366 F.2d 303 (1966).
The Bush administration
unleashed all the Orwellian power of the state secrets privilege
this week in arguing for the dismissal of an ACLU challenge to the
NSA's warrantless eavesdropping program.
During a June 12 hearing,
the
New York Timesreports,
U.S. District Judge Anna Diggs Taylor
appeared frustrated by the argument that the privilege applies even
though the government has publicly defended the program.
"You have conceded, have
you not, that a program has been authorized?" she asked government
attorney Anthony J. Coppolino.
"There
is very much a difference between the existence of an activity and
the details of that activity," Coppolino replied.
A
Virginia judge last month cited that same "critical distinction" in
dismissing the civil-rights case of a man who claims the CIA
illegally detained him as part of its clandestine anti-terrorist
"renditions" program. Details of the program "are validly claimed as
state secrets," the judge ruled.
None of
the ACLU plaintiffs, who include lawyers and journalists, alleged in
their complaint that they were
specific targets of eavesdropping -– and Coppolino made clear that
the government wasn't going to enlighten them on that key detail one
way or the other.
"The
government cannot confirm or deny whether a particular individual is
subject to surveillance," he said.
Unless
they were subjected to surveillance, the plaintiffs may not be able
to show they have suffered an "injury in fact;" without an injury in
fact, they cannot show standing to file suit.
Checkmate. Or, as Coppolino put it, "the critical facts necessary to
adjudicate" the standing question "are subject to the state secrets
privilege."
Amping up
the rhetoric in his challenge to Michigan's child-support law,
"father's rights" test plaintiff
Matthew
Dubay
is claiming he has a right to choose "to
make love without making a baby" that is "impenetrable to state
action."
A federal
judge in Detroit has set a June 28 hearing on a
motion to dismiss filed by the state which argues Dubay's
high-profile case has nothing to do with any fundamental rights and
is simply a frivolous attempt to avoid his obligation to support the
child he conceived with ex-girlfriend
Lauren
Wells.
In his
response to the motion, Dubay says Roe v. Wade bars the
state from intruding on "the right to privately engage in
consensual sexual activity and the right to privately choose to not
be a parent."
He and
Wells, the brief continues, were in that "privacy zone" when "they
made the choice to make love without making a baby." While Wells
"may subsequently change her mind" about being a parent,
the
state authority may not subsequently invalidate Matt's choice
[not to be a parent] because it was made in a protected space,
impenetrable to state action.
The state
has pointed out that a man does not have the same rights under
Roe as a woman because "it is
the woman who physically bears the child." But Dubay contends the
right to choose "applies regardless of biology" and cannot survive
if "limited only to people with internal reproductive systems."
The
plaintiff also makes the startling claim that his case, if
successful, would reduce public spending on illegitimate children.
"If a woman knows that her potential sexual partner has the choice
to not accept parenthood," he reasons, "then it may promote more
responsible sexual behavior."
An Oregon judge has for
the first time pierced the sovereign immunity of the Vatican in a
sexual abuse case, finding it does not apply to the placement of a
known child molester in a Portland parish.
The Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act (FSIA) ordinarily protects the Holy See from lawsuits.
But there are two exceptions and U.S. District
Judge Michael A. Mosman found that one of them -– the
"tortious activity" exception –- allows a Seattle-area man allegedly
abused by a priest in the mid-1960s to pursue claims for vicarious
liability and negligence.
According to the
complaint, the Vatican placed Father
Andrew Ronan at St. Albert's Church in Portland despite
knowing of "Ronan's dangerous propensities to abuse children." He
had admitted previously abusing at least four youths while working
as a priest in Ireland and Chicago.
"[This is] the first time
any court has held or acknowledged there is a basis in law to hold
the Holy See accountable for cover up and concealment and this
international movement of predatory priests,"
Jeffrey R. Anderson, co-counsel for the John Doe plaintiff,
said.
Denying a motion to
dismiss, Mosman reserved his most striking comments for the
defense's argument that the FSIA immunity applies
because the Vatican made a discretionary policy judgment in
transferring Ronan. In 1987, a Mississippi judge dismissed a similar
case under the "discretionary function" doctrine.
"Placement of a known child
molester in a Portland parish, where he would have unlimited access
to young boys for the third time, without warning the new
parishioners, is not the kind of discretionary act" that is entitled
to FSIA protection, Mosman said in his
opinion.
The Vatican immediately
filed a notice of appeal. "This decision does not establish
jurisdiction over the Holy See, let alone establish liability," its
attorney said.
But at the very least, Mosman has
given some credibility to suits against the Vatican over molestation
by priests, which some legal experts have derided as publicity
stunts. A similar case, O'Bryan v. Holy See,
is pending in Kentucky.
The parents of a teenager
killed in a car accident have sued a wealthy Texas attorney for
wrongful death, alleging that Julie Jensen
had the "superior intelligence" to know better than to let her
14-year-old son drive a turbo-charged "muscle car."
Jensen's parenting is one
of several explosive issues in a case that has rocked rural Vermont.
In August 2004, her son, Charles Meyer,
lost control of his twin-turbo 1994 Toyota Supra on a state highway,
killing two local boys -- Norman Woolard,
16, and Philip Leno, 17 – who had been
working at her Vermont summer home.
According to police, Meyer
bragged that the car "had 330 horsepower stock and could do 155
mph." Jensen had only given it to him four months before the
accident.
In a highly unusual
preemptive move, Jensen sued the parents of the dead youths in
March, filing for a declaratory judgment clearing her and Meyer of
liability or finding Woolard and Leno contributorily negligent.
Neither of the deceased
was wearing a seatbelt, the federal court
complaint alleged, and Jensen had authorized Woolard, not her
son, to drive the car.
But in a counterclaim
filed June 5, Leno's parents argue that neither Meyer nor Woolard
was skilled or experienced enough to drive an "inherently dangerous"
vehicle and that Jensen -- as a "highly experienced, superbly
trained" attorney -- owes a higher standard of duty toward the
victims.
"The fact that a mother of
'superior intelligence and ability' ... took [the Lenos'] son away
from them is atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community," the brief says.
Woolard's mother,
Elaine Cashin, has filed her own
countersuit against Jensen and Meyer.
The tragedy has inspired
some commentary about the social gulf between rich outsiders who
summer in Vermont and the working poor who service them. But an
attorney for Jensen told the Washington Post that she "has contacts with
the northeast kingdom that go back 25 years. She's part of that
community."
The Lenos, moreover,
allege Jensen, a philanthropist who has donated to community
agencies in Vermont, had "specialized knowledge" of
the psychological,
social and economic characteristics of the so-called
“disadvantaged youth” of the Northeast Kingdom, especially
“young males.”
In a confidential juvenile
court proceeding, Meyer was charged with grossly negligent operation
of an automobile. If Jensen really is so smart and skilled, she
should settle the civil litigation before things get even uglier.
If it works for
quarrelling kids, why not for bickering lawyers? A Florida judge has
ordered counsel in an insurance case to play "rock, paper, scissors"
to resolve a procedural dispute.
The plaintiff's attorney
had asked U.S. District Judge Gregory A.
Presnell to designate a location for a deposition after
failing to reach agreement with the defense. Both attorneys have
their offices in the same Tampa building.
Noting that the dispute
was "the latest in a series of Gordian knots that the parties have
been unable to untangle without enlisting the assistance of the
federal courts," Presnell fashioned what he called a "new form of
alternative dispute resolution."
On June 30, his
order says, counsel shall convene at a
neutral site of their choosing or in front of the federal courthouse
in Tampa and, each accompanied by a paralegal acting as "attendant
and witness,"
shall engage in one (1) game
of “rock, paper, scissors.”
The contestants are
David J. Pettinato (Merlin Law Group)
for the plaintiff and D. Lee Craig
(Butler Pappas Weihmuller Katz Craig) for the defendant. The winner
gets to select the location for the deposition, though the loser, of
course, may appeal.
If the attorneys continue
to bicker, there's always another form of ADR available to Presnell
-- "pistols at dawn."
A San Francisco attorney's
gamble on a racial discrimination case paid off handsomely as a jury
awarded $61 million to two FedEx Ground
drivers whose Lebanese descent made them a target of slurs from a
manager.
Edgar Rizkallah and Kamil Issa
were turned down by ten law firms and a renowned civil-rights
organization before Christopher B. Dolan
of the Dolan Law Firm took their case. Dolan is now celebrating the
largest single civil-rights judgment under California's employment
discrimination law.
"This is a significant
statement by the jury, 12 Americans, that harassment of Arabs will
not be tolerated," he said.
According to trial
testimony, Stacey Shoun, a manager at a
FedEx facility in Oakland,
routinely taunted Rizkallah
and Issa by calling them "camel jockeys," "terrorists," "sand
niggers" and other ethnic slurs.
The
Alameda County Superior Court jury held Shoun personally liable for
$1 million in compensatory damages and $56 in punitives. The entire
award breaks down as follows:
Plaintiff
Shoun Damages
FedEx Damages
Compensatory
Punitive
Compensatory
Punitive
$500,000
$28
$5,000,000
$25,000,000
Edgar
Rizkallah
Kamil Issa
$500,000
$28
$5,000,000
$25,000,000
FedEx called the award
"wrong and excessive." But the ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages is well within the range of what the California Supreme
Court has recently found acceptable.
Dolan has specialized
in motorcycle and other vehicular accident cases. According to his
Web site, his previous jury trial best was $2.5 million in damages
for an injured motorcyclist.
In a colorful Internet
speech case, a Pennsylvania judge has ruled that a self-proclaimed
"asshole" is not liable for allegedly defamatory material posted on
his Web site.
Tucker Max, a Duke Law School graduate, uses tuckermax.com to
"share my adventures with the world" and host message boards. The
subject of several messages was an ill-fated New Year's Eve party
hosted in Philadelphia by publicist Anthony
DiMeo.
In a libel suit he filed
against Max, DiMeo alleged six postings that expressed anger toward
him were defamatory, including one that said, "I just wanted to let
you know that I think that you are the biggest piece of shit I have
ever heard of.
"
The Communications Decency
Act of 1996 shields Internet service providers from liability for
material posted on their sites by third parties, but DiMeo argued
that Max acted as a content provider by exercising editorial control
over postings.
U.S. District Judge
Stewart Dalzell disagreed and granted
Max's motion to dismiss. "Because DiMeo alleges that Max did no more
than select and edit posts, we cannot consider him to be the
'provider' of the 'content' that DiMeo finds to be offensive," the
opinion said.
While Max's site could be
a "poster child" for vulgarity on the Internet, Dalzell concluded,
"'we should also protect the autonomy that such a medium confers to
ordinary people as well as media magnates.'
Here we do so by protecting the coarse conversation that, it
appears, never ends on tuckermax.com."
The
New York Court of Appeals has declined to apply a common-law
concept of negligence to an animal attack case, leaving a handyman
without a remedy for injuries he suffered when he was charged by a
stud bull.
Larry Bard claimed the owner of the bull should have
protected him from being attacked at an Otsego County farm. The
animal was allowed to roam freely in the dairy barn so it could
impregnate cows stabled there.
As the Restatement of
Torts puts it, the owner of a domestic animal, which the owner does
not know or have reason to know to be abnormally dangerous, is
nonetheless liable if he negligently fails to prevent harm.
But on a 4-3 vote, the
appeals court upheld summary dismissal of the case, declining to
"dilute our traditional rule [of strict liability for animal
attacks] under the guise of a companion common-law cause of action
for negligence."
Under that rule, restated
in Collier v. Zambito, 1 NY3d 444 (2004),
the owner of a
domestic animal who either knows or should have known of that
animal's vicious propensities will be held liable for the harm
the animal causes as a result of those propensities.
"Here, [the bull] had
never attacked any farm animal or human being” before its assault on
Bard, the majority
opinion noted.
In a dissent,
Judge Robert S. Smith said
at least 20 states "appear to
follow the Restatement rule" and the court's adoption of the Collier rule as the
exclusive measure of liability is "contrary to simple fairness."
"Why should a person who
is negligent in managing an automobile or a child be subject to
liability," he asked, "and not one who is negligent in managing a
horse or bull?"
In another recent animal
case, a Manhattan judge ruled that a woman could claim punitive
damages for injuries suffered from a dog bite. There was "ample
evidence," Supreme Court Judge Joan A. Madden
said, from which a trier of fact could infer that the dog's owners
"were aware of [its] tendency to bite, but deliberately failed to
prevent further incidents."
Marsh v. Della Femina
A
co-author of
"Freakonomics" should be able to defeat a libel suit by arguing that
the average reader of his best-seller would not ascribe a defamatory
meaning to his statement about another economist.
What has been billed as
"the highest-profile scholarly defamation battle" since Holocaust
denier David Irving sued another
historian essentially boils down to the meaning of the word
"replicate."
In "Freakonomics,"
Dr. Steven D. Levitt discusses the
theory of Dr. John R. Lott that new
laws allowing people to carry concealed weapons have helped reduce
crime. While the theory is "admittedly intriguing," Levitt writes,
When other scholars have
tried to replicate [Lott's] results, they found that
right-to-carry laws simply don't bring down crime.
Lott says in his libel
complaint that "The term 'replicate' has an objective meaning in
the world of academic research and scholarship" and Levitt's
statement is defamatory per se because it attacks his
professional integrity.
According to Lott,
"replicate" means other scholars analyzed the same data he analyzed
and used the same method of analyzing it "in order to determine
whether they can reach the same result." Levitt, therefore, is
"alleging that Lott falsified his results."
Apparently, however, even
scientists cannot agree on the technical meaning of "replicate." The
standard dictionary definition is "repeat" or "reproduce."
Since the case is one of
libel-by-implication, an ordinary reader would have to infer that
other scholars failed to reproduce the same results as Lott because
he faked them. That is surely not the reasonable inference that the
law requires.
In a
motion to dismiss, Levitt argues that his statement
was a protected expression of opinion, that it is not capable of a
defamatory per se meaning and that it is capable of a
reasonable, non-defamatory per se interpretation.
Lott did not sue Levitt's
co-author, journalist Stephen J. Dubner.
The two economists aren't exactly friends, reports
TheChronicle of Higher Education, which quoted
another scholar as saying, "These guys don't send each other
Christmas cards, let's just say that.
"Big Love" meets insurance
fraud in a lawsuit that alleges a member of a polygamy-practicing
family misrepresented herself as a house guest to collect insurance
benefits for property lost in a fire.
Mary
Keaton, the third wife of a polygamist, lived with her
children in a Bountiful, Utah, home owned by her father-in-law,
Joseph Kingston. A July 1997 fire
caused substantial damage to the home, which had been divided into
two separate residences.
According to a
complaint filed by
Continental Insurance, a homeowners policy issued to Kingston
in March 1997 did not cover Keaton, who occupied the "North Side"
residence which sustained most of the fire damage.
So Keaton, Kingston and
other family members, the suit says, devised a scheme to submit
insurance claims for Keaton's damaged or destroyed personal property
in the name of her sister-in-law, Rebecca
Kingston, who had formerly lived in the home and was covered
under the policy.
As part of this scheme,
the conspirators allegedly misrepresented to Continental that
Rebecca was the "North Side” resident at the time of the fire and
that "Mary Keaton was simply a friend of Rebecca Kingston who was a
temporary house guest."
Keaton was, in fact, a
tenant of Joseph Kingston paying rent and utilities, Continental
says.
The complaint does not
mention how Continental discovered the alleged fraud. It does say,
however, that Keaton inflated the value of the claims by replacing
her lost property -- "much of which had been obtained from
second-hand thrift stores and sales" -- with items of "far superior"
quality and value.
The Kingstons belong to
one of the largest polygamous groups in the country, consisting of
some 1,200 members.
The
3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that negligence
claims against a factory for poisoning dairy cows are not
time-barred because a farmer gave too much weight to the opinion of
a vet in trying to discover why the animals were sick.
Merrill Mest and his wife sued Cabot
Corp. in 2001, alleging that fluoride emissions from the
company's specialty metals factory in Montgomery County, Pa., had
poisoned his cows by contaminating vegetation. Fluorosis, derived
from fluoride exposure, causes symptoms in cows including lower milk
production and conception rates.
A statute of limitations
may run from the time of the discovery of the cause of an injury as
long as the plaintiff exercised due diligence in trying to determine
the cause. While the Mests first noticed sick cows in 1980, they
argued they were unable to determine the cause until 1999.
In 1982, they had hired a
vet and a nutritionist at Penn State University who concluded from
the results of an investigation of feed samples that the cows did
not suffer from fluorosis.
But U.S. District
Judge Cynthia M. Rufe summarily
dismissed the case as time-barred under the two-year statute of
limitations, ruling it was distinguishable from a precedent
involving the same defendant.
In Debiec v. Cabot
Corp., 352 F.3d 117 (2003), the
3rd Circuit held the discovery rule applied to the case of a woman
who died of a disease caused by exposure to beryllium after her
doctor diagnosed her with another illness.
"A person's reliance on his
or her personal physician's diagnosis is not the same as a farmer's
reliance on the conclusions of a veterinarian or scientist," Rufe
said. While the patient in Debiec had built up "a
relationship" with her doctor, "There is no evidence of such a
relationship between Mr. Mest and the [Penn State] doctors."
In reversing Rufe, the 3rd
Circuit called that distinction "irrelevant" for the purpose of
deciding whether the Mests reasonably relied on what they were told
in 1982.
"Farmers
arguably rely more on the professional abilities of veterinarians
and animal scientists than patients rely on their doctors," the
opinion
said, noting that
farmers can only
observe the objective symptoms of their animals and must rely on
veterinarians and animal scientists to interpret those objective
symptoms, whereas human patients know what they are
experiencing and can describe
it to their doctors.
This case also suggests vets can be relied on to screw up as much as
doctors.
Two Hurricane Katrina
insurance coverage cases in Mississippi may help decide whether
plaintiffs can distinguish between losses caused by wind and rain
and those caused by flooding.
Senior U.S. District
Judge L.T. Senter recently refused to
dismiss the cases against State Farm
and Allstate, finding that provisions
in their homeowners policies "created ambiguities in the context of
damages sustained by the insured during a hurricane.
"
In Tuepker v. State
Farm, the insurer relied in
part on the convoluted language of an "anti-concurrent
cause" provision to argue that its policy does not cover the losses
of a Long Beach, Miss., couple whose home was damaged by Katrina.
The clause, as Senter put
it, "purport[s] to exclude coverage for wind
and rain damage, both of which are covered losses under this policy,
where an excluded cause of loss, e.g. water damage, excludes
coverage."
But the judge said in a May 24
opinion that the clause is
"ambiguous in light of the other policy
provisions granting coverage for wind
and rain damage and in light of the inclusion
of a 'hurricane deductible' as part
of the policy."
Allstate
failed for similar reasons in March to force dismissal of the
Katrina-related claims of a Gulfport couple by invoking an exclusion
of coverage for wind and rain damage where water damage is "the
predominant cause of the loss."
Buente v. Allstate
In both
cases, Senter held the plaintiffs may recover for their losses
To the
extent that [they] can prove their allegations that the
hurricane
winds (or objects driven by those winds) and rains entering the
insured premises through openings caused by the hurricane winds
proximately caused damage to
their insured property.
Ironically, this type of proximate cause analysis is exactly what
Katrina victims in a Louisiana case want to avoid. A state law, they
argued in a motion for summary judgment,
requires their insurer to pay out the full value of their policies
irrespective of whether damage was caused by wind or water.
But U.S.
District
Judge
Richard T. Haik
ruled May 18 that the so-called Valued Policy Law did not apply and
the homeowners should get only "what they paid for," that is,
coverage for wind damage.
A
plaintiffs' attorney had told the judge unavailingly that it would
be difficult if not impossible to determine how much damage was
caused by wind in a home that was completely destroyed by a
combination of wind and water. "How do you realistically get in and
separate those issues?" he asked.
Moonlighting in porn has
again proven costly for police officers as an appeals court ruled
that two Florida sheriff's deputies were properly fired for taking
part in sexually explicit photos and videos.
Ronald Thaeter and Timothy Moran,
who performed for pay-per-view Web sites operated by the wife of a
colleague, invoked the First Amendment in challenging their
termination from the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office.
In a similar case from
California, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled in 2004 that courts should balance the speech of a government
employee with the "proper functioning of government offices," which
cannot be compromised.
Roe v. City of San Diego
But the speech must also
involve a "matter of public concern." And the
11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said Thaeter and Moran
couldn't pass that threshold test.
"Similar to the
pornographic conduct of the police officer in Roe, the paid
participation of Deputies Thaeter and Moran in pornographic
photographing and videotaping for Internet display for a fee 'does
not qualify as a matter of public
concern under any view of the public concern test,'" the
opinion concluded.
Under the Palm Beach County
sheriff's ethics code, an employee agrees to "keep my private life unsullied as an
example to all." A sheriff's investigator found that rule vague, but
the 11th Circuit said the plaintiffs' conduct "reflected on their
fitness as deputies and undermined public confidence in the PBCSO."
A California judge has
ruled that an online dating service can continue to exclude married
people from membership, dealing a blow to a man going through a
divorce who claimed the policy is discriminatory.
"Plaintiff has not
established a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of this case at
trial," Alameda County Superior Court Judge
Frank Roesch said in a brief order denying
John Claassen's motion for a
preliminary injunction.
Claassen, an Oakland
attorney who is separated from his wife, claimed he was entitled to
an injunction requiring eHarmony.com to
accept him as a member because a dating service cannot rationally
justify excluding people on the basis of marital status.
California's Unruh Civil
Rights Act applies to a business establishment that arbitrarily
discriminates among patrons.
"[N]o California public
policy -– let alone a strong one –- supports a business
establishment's interference in the highly personal decision of when
and with whom a person should associate once his or her marriage
effectively ends through the filing of dissolution proceedings,"
Claassen, representing himself, said in a court brief (excerpted
here).
But eHarmony contended that California
"has established a clear public policy in favor of marital
reconciliation," noting that, under the state's Family Code,
a judge
must not dissolve a marriage "whenever there appears any 'reasonable
possibility of reconciliation.'"
eHarmony's exclusion of married people, the company argued in
opposing an injunction,
constitutes an eminently
practical and reasonable means for eHarmony to avoid
facilitating extra-marital relationships involving 'separated'
people for whom reconciliation remains a possibility.
In fact, the Family
Code allows a stay of dissolution in a no-fault case for 30 days if
there is a chance the parties will reconcile. Assuming California
has this "clear" public policy, Claassen has a point in saying it is not "strong"
enough to overcome the Unruh Act's stand against discrimination.
But having lost the
preliminary injunction battle, the plaintiff has pretty much lost the
war. In his
complaint, he also seeks
Free speech on the
Internet won a huge victory today as a California appeals court
found that Apple Computer cannot force
two tech-gossip blogs to divulge the sources who allegedly leaked
trade secret information to them.
The
6th District Court of Appeal shredded not only Apple's
arguments for disclosure but also the trial judge who last year
denied the motion of the online publishers of
Power Page and Apple Insider to
protect their sources from Apple subpoenas.
Apple
belittled the bloggers'
journalistic efforts as beneath the protection of California's press
shield law, and Santa Clara County Superior Court
Judge James P. Kleinberg held that
Apple's right
to "keep and maintain proprietary
information" about a new product code-named "Asteroid" trumped the
free-speech rights of the two Web sites.
But the appeals court
refused to distinguish between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" news,
concluding in its
opinion that
If [the bloggers']
activities and social function differ at all from those of
traditional print and broadcast journalists, the distinctions
are minute, subtle, and constitutionally immaterial.
Presiding
Justice Conrad L. Rushing, writing for
the court, also could not have been more forceful in rejecting
Kleinberg's dismissive view that the bloggers' postings
did nothing more than feed "the public's insatiable desire for
information."
"[A]ny
movement by such a cultural leader [as Apple] into a whole new area
of expression -- as was promised by the Asteroid product –- is
newsworthy," Rushing said, and
The lawful acquisition of
information necessary to anticipate and respond to such changes
is the birthright of every human.
Apple obtained a court
order to subpoena Power Page and Apple Insider as part of a lawsuit
accusing unidentified defendants of misappropriating trade secrets
and passing them onto the sites. The company has questioned
employees known to have access to Asteroid marketing materials.
But the 6th District said
any sympathy for Apple in its quest to identify "treacherous"
employees
"cannot blind us to the
gross impropriety of using the courts and their powers of compulsory
process as a tool and adjunct of an employer’s personnel
department."
In some ways, Rushing has
done here for bloggers' rights what the U.S.
Supreme Court did for "traditional" journalists' rights in
New York Times v. Sullivan. The
decision should withstand any California
Supreme Court review and force the dismissal of Apple's
related suit against Nick dePlume,
publisher of the Think Secret
tech-gossip site.
UPDATE ...Apple did not
appeal to the California Supreme Court, leaving the 6th
District's decision to stand as precedent.