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Tuesday January 08, 2008
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ON POINT

On Point Archive

A BLOG BY MATTHEW HELLER

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11th Circuit Belittles Inmate's Abuse Injury

 

Do Lunch with This Lawyer - Or Else

 

Fantasy League Firm Hits Legal Grand Slam

 

Judge Finds NYC Tiger Rescue Legal

 

Burger Not to Blame for Diner's Illness

 

Holloway Kin's Case Kicked Out of N.Y.

 

Libel Case Error Leaves 'Sour Taste'

 

Attorney Bets On Fantasy Sports Suit

 

Anti-Gay T-Shirt Case Heats up 9th Circuit

 

Chilling Ruling in Ice-Cream Store Case

 

Timid Judge Lets State Secrets Trump Privacy

 

Trauma Claim Allowed in Dog Stomping Case

 

Month of Misery for Same-Sex Marriage

 

Court Eases Protection for Disabled Workers

 

Update: DontDateHimGirl Case

 

Failure to Back Up Costs Screenwriter

 

Update: Apple v. Bloggers

 

Court Won't Unring Bell for Okla. Judge

 

Update: Lawn Mower in Reverse Lawsuits

 

Border Vigilante Beats Civil Trespass Case

 

Alleged Cheater Turns on Dating Gossip Site

 

HIV Infection Ruling Opens Pandora's Box?

 

Aide Alleges Marlon Brando Will A Fake

 

High Court Backs Inmate 'Mind Control'

 

Elevator Ordeal May Test Negligence Law

 

Boaters Denied Right to a Coastal View

 

Nolte Settles With Teenage Rape Victim

 

Update: MySpace Negligence Suit

 

Melvin and Howard: The Courtroom Sequel

 

Feds' New Absurdity:  'Reasonable Terrorist'

 

Tardiness Knocks Out FBI Scandal Lawsuit

 

Calif. Bill Tightens Judicial Eligibility Law

 

Ruling A Bad 'Twist' for First Amendment

 

B < PL = No Case for Goalpost Injury Victim

 

MySpace Sued for Failing to Protect Teen

 

Parents Fight for Medical Care Rights

 

Jury Awards $2M for Tot's Mower Death

 

Joyce Scholar Tests Copyright Defense

 

Orwell Lives in Feds' Reply to Wiretap Suit

 

Men's Rights Plaintiff Claims 'Privacy Zone'

 

Vatican's Immunity Pierced in Abuse Case

 

Parent Sued in Fatal Muscle Car Crash

 

Fla. Lawyers Ordered to Play Kids' Game

 

FedEx Drivers Win Record $61M Award

 

Judge Shields 'Poster Child' for Vulgarity

 

No Remedy for Victim of Raging Bull Attack

 

Scholarly Feud Hinges on 'Replicate' Meaning

 

Insurer Alleges 'Big Love'-Style Fraud

 

Cow Poisoning Case Not Time-Barred

 

Katrina Cases Facing Proximate Cause Test

 

Porn Venture Good Cause for Firing Cops

 

Judge Jilts Dating Service Bias Suit

 

Apple Crushed in Internet Speech Case

CURRENT POSTINGS

The New 'On Point'

The ON POINT blog has now been replaced by OnPointNews.com, a “New Take On Legal News” edited by Matthew Heller which combines blog-style content with newspaper-style design. Features include “Story of the Day," “On the Docket” (upcoming court hearings of interest), “On File” (recently filed court documents), and On Point Graphics. Click here to go to the site.
 


Does Constitution Permit A 'Little' Sex Abuse?

The full 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has declined to review whether a male prison inmate suffered cruel and unusual punishment when a female guard forced him to masturbate.

Only Judge Rosemary Barkett contested the court's order denying en banc review of the Eighth Amendment claim of Boxer X, who alleges guard Angela Harris threatened him with disciplinary action if he did not strip and masturbate for her enjoyment while he was incarcerated in a Georgia prison.

"The use of prison disciplinary procedures to extract sexual favors from prisoners is the type of conduct that is at the heart of what the Eighth Amendment proscribes," Barkett said in a dissent.

A three-judge panel dismissed the inmate's claim in January, finding his injury did not meet the "objectively, sufficiently serious" test of prison abuse case law. "A female prison guard’s solicitation of a male prisoner’s manual masturbation, even under the threat of reprisal, does not present more than de minimis injury," the ruling said.

Barkett questioned "what rationale the panel uses to support its position:"

Does the panel opinion stand for the proposition that the sexual abuse of prisoners is not offensive to contemporary standards of decency and human dignity? Is the opinion suggesting that the Constitution permits a “little” sexual abuse?

Her pleas did not move Judge Edward E. Carnes, to whom the Eighth Amendment issue was not of "exceptional importance" meriting en banc review. Boxer X, he noted, can proceed on his Fourth Amendment privacy claim and "the role of our court system in civil cases is not to decide how many analytical angels can dance on the head of a particular injury."

But since when are plaintiffs barred from seeking recovery against a defendant on more than one theory? By belittling Boxer X's alleged injury, the 11th Circuit has truly committed, as Barkett put it, a "precedent-setting error of exceptional importance."

8/10/06

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Just Don't Say 'No' to Lunch with This Lawyer

In Phoenix, you'd better accept a lunch invitation from attorney David A. Selden –- or he may file a motion to compel your presence.

Selden, of Stinson Morrison Hecker, thought a lunch would be a good way of unblocking some procedural logjams in a commercial litigation case. "In this day of e-mails and voice mails, you don't get to the bottom of things," he explains.

After opposing counsel Dow G. Ostlund (Tiffany & Bosco, Phoenix) turned him down, Selden filed a "Motion to Compel Acceptance of Lunch Invitation." Ostlund, who distrusted Selden's motives, replied by proposing lunch at a Phoenix steakhouse that isn't open for lunch.

In a jocular July 19 ruling, Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Pendleton Gaines said he had "rarely seen a motion with more merit" and ordered the lunch to be conducted by Aug. 18. "There are a number of fine restaurants within easy driving distance of both counsel's offices," he suggested.

The lawyers, in fact, beat the judge to the punch. By the time the ruling was issued, Selden had hosted Ostlund at his firm's office where they enjoyed a catered lunch.

"I'll use it for leverage any chance I get," Selden says of the compelled lunch motion. "It's another arrow in the litigation quiver."

8/10/06

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Baseball's Bid for Fantasy Rights Strikes Out

Major League Baseball deservedly got grand-slammed in a high-stakes intellectual property case as a Missouri judge found that the operator of a fantasy baseball league is entitled to use baseball players' names and performance statistics without a license.

U.S. Magistrate Judge Mary Ann L. Medler set a precedent that not only enables CBC Distribution and Marketing of St. Louis to keep operating its online leagues, but also should help shield the entire fantasy sports industry from publicity rights lawsuits.

"CBC’s mere use of Major League baseball players’ names in conjunction with their playing records does not establish a violation of the players’ right of publicity," Medler said in granting summary judgment to CBC on its claims for declaratory relief.

CBC filed suit in February 2005 claiming that Advanced Media, the Internet arm of Major League Baseball, was seeking monopoly control of baseball statistics associated with players' names. Advanced Media and the players' union countersued for violations of publicity rights.

More than 15 million people spend an estimated $1.5 billion a year to play fantasy sports, and Medler's opinion shows that baseball's challenge to CBC was little more than an opportunistic lunge at that lucrative market.

Addressing the threshold issue of the case, the judge found none of the elements of the publicity rights tort apply to CBC's leagues. Baseball players, she said in her opinion, "do not earn a living by the publication of their playing record" and "Players' records are readily available in the public domain."

Medler went on to stress that if the publicity rights of baseball players trumped the First Amendment, CBC’s "right of freedom of expression would be totally extinguished." While the defendants claimed they only objected to the use of players' names,

it would be meaningless and useless to its game participants for CBC to report that there were five home runs or ten singles in a baseball game without identifying the players who hit the home runs or singles.

CBC lost only on its claim that its use of names and statistics is copyrightable and, therefore, copyright law preempts publicity rights claims.

UPDATE ... Advanced Media and the Major League Baseball Players Assn. will appeal the decision. "We continue to believe that the use of the players, without their consent, to create this type of commercial venture is improper," they said in a joint statement.

8/9/06

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Raid on Apartment to Rescue Tiger Ruled Legal

A federal judge has thrown out an illegal search case against police officers who entered a New York City man's apartment without a warrant and removed his 450-pound Siberian tiger from the premises.

"The word chutzpah ... is now vastly overused in the legal literature," U.S. District Judge Sidney H. Stein said. "Yet in a case such as this ... it is a most appropriate term to use."

Police learned that Antoine Yates was raising the tiger in his fifth-floor Harlem residence after receiving an anonymous tip. Two days earlier, officers had found him near the fifth story elevators with a deep gash in his leg, but he told them he had been bitten by a pit bull.

During an Oct. 4, 2003 raid on Yates' apartment, an officer who had rappelled down the side of the building shot Ming the tiger through a window with a tranquilizer gun. An alligator named Al was also removed from the apartment.

Yates, who has admitted being mauled by Ming and was convicted of reckless endangerment, showed his chutzpah by suing the city on claims that the confiscation of his pets violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

Granting the city's motion for summary judgment, Judge Stein said the officers were immune from liability because their actions "easily comply with the established New York standard ... for when an emergency justifies entering a home without a warrant."

The opinion also addressed Yates' allegation that officers stole his pet dwarf rabbit:

The whereabouts of the rabbit have not been ascertained, but there is no indication in the record that Al the alligator was questioned in that regard. The Court suggests that he may be more knowledgeable on this issue than he has disgorged to date.

8/8/06

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Wendy's Cleared of Serving Bacteria Burger

Diane Roney took only two bites out of a Wendy's bacon cheeseburger before losing her appetite and throwing it in the trash. Given the outcome of her food-poisoning case against the fast-food chain, she should have kept it as evidence.

A federal jury took only 30 minutes to decide last week that the burger was not contaminated with E. coli bacteria and did not cause Roney to become violently ill. She was admitted to a hospital with kidney failure the day after sampling the sandwich in March 2001 at a Wendy's restaurant in Saco, Maine.

Wendy's argued that Roney, 57, fell ill from a possible enzyme deficiency and, if she did have E. coli, could have been infected by other food she ate or exposure to schoolchildren who might not have washed their hands after using the restroom.

"Given all of the undisputed facts, a reasonable jury could only speculate that the cheeseburger sandwich was to blame," the company said in a brief.

Roney claimed she ate a burger that was so raw it leaked about a spoonful of blood when she cut it in half. Undercooked meat, particularly hamburger, is believed to be the most common cause of E. coli infection in the U.S.

But proving causation is the major problem for plaintiffs in food-poisoning cases and Roney barely survived a motion for summary judgment.

In a March ruling, U.S. Magistrate Judge Margaret J. Kravnick noted that Roney's case for causation was "complicated" by the fact that "the subject bacon cheeseburger was discarded and, hence, could not be examined for the presence of E. coli bacteria."

Doctors also waited too long to take a stool or other culture from Roney that could be tested for E. coli contamination.

"I find this question to be an extremely close one to call," Kravnick said of the causation issue before allowing the case to proceed to trial. It obviously wasn't close for the jury.

8/7/06

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Holloway Parents' Case Kicked Out of N.Y.

A judge has barred the parents of Natalee Holloway from suing a Dutch student in New York, possibly leaving them with little recourse in their quest to solve the disappearance of their daughter.

"[T]his court finds that New York is not a convenient forum for litigating the instant dispute which 'has no discernible connection to New York but a very substantial nexus to' Aruba," Manhattan Supreme Court Judge Barbara R. Kapnick said in dismissing the parents' suit against Joran van der Sloot and his father.

Elizabeth Twitty and Dave Holloway allege that van der Sloot abducted and sexually assaulted Natalee while she was on a class trip to Aruba, a Caribbean island. At a hearing in May, their attorney said the suit was "their last chance for justice, to find out what happened to their daughter."

But Kapnick found the defendants would be inconvenienced if they were compelled to litigate the case in New York, perhaps by being unable to subpoena key witnesses, including law enforcement personnel, who are in Aruba.

The decision is a big victory for the van der Sloots' high-profile attorney, Joseph Tacopino, who argued that the "case belongs in Aruba, period."

"[T]he courts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, of which Aruba is a constituent part, have been found to present an appropriate alternative forum in which to bring suit," Kapnick said.

Aruba may not, however, be much of an alternative for Natalee's parents.

8/6/06

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Judge's Libel Case Error Leaves 'Sour Taste'

Because the record was "insufficiently fermented" when a trial judge found a prosecutor was not a public official, a federal appeals court has thrown out a $950,000 libel verdict against the Boston Phoenix weekly newspaper.

In awarding the damages to Marc E. Mandel, a former Maryland assistant state's attorney, a jury found the Phoenix was negligent in describing him as a child molester in an article about child custody disputes.

Senior U.S. District Judge Edward F. Harrington had ruled on summary judgment that Mandel was a private figure and therefore did not have to meet the higher actual malice standard that applies to public official plaintiffs in defamation cases.

Ordering a new trial, the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal said the principle of not drinking wine before its time applies to summary judgment:

[I]t is a deliciously helpful device if properly timed, but one that can leave a sour taste if brought to bear on an insufficiently fermented record.

The factual record at the summary judgment stage of Mandel's case "was too uncertain to warrant a legal conclusion either way about Mandel's status" under libel law, the opinion concluded.

The good news for Mandel is the court found he sufficiently established at trial that the Phoenix's statements about him were false and the paper failed to exercise due care in publishing them.

Also On Mandel v. Boston Phoenix

8/4/06

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Lawyer Bets On Case Against Fantasy Sports

A Colorado attorney who is also a professional poker player is claiming in a first-of-its-kind lawsuit that Internet fantasy sports leagues are "unlawful gambling schemes," but the courts are unlikely to deal him a winning hand.

Chuck Humphrey

No state has ever prosecuted fantasy sports league operators or players for illegal gambling and three bills recently introduced before Congress that would prohibit Internet gambling include an exemption for fantasy sports.

But in a federal complaint filed in New Jersey, Chuck Humphrey alleges the operators of the Sportsline, ESPN, and TSN leagues receive illegal profits from the "wagers" that players make when they pay to participate in the leagues.

Because league winners are determined by the statistics of actual players in pro sports leagues, Humphrey contends, "fantasy sports are games of chance." Just as bettors on horse races cannot control the performance of the horses,

fantasy sports contestants lack the ability to accurately predict and control the performance of their respectively drafted athletes. Thus, the elements of chance predominate over the elements of skill in determining the distribution of prizes.

Humphrey, a co-founder of the Tournament of Champions of Poker who does not play fantasy sports himself, is suing under a New Jersey law which allows third parties to seek recovery of money lost through illegal gambling.

As far as precedent, he could point to a 1991 Florida attorney general's opinion. While "It might well be argued that skill is involved in the selection of a successful fantasy team," the opinion said, the state's anti-gambling law "prohibits stakes, bets or wagers on the results of any contests of skill."

Fantasy sports league entry fees "are used to make up the prizes" and therefore "clearly appear to qualify as a 'stake, bet or wager' as defined by the courts," the attorney general concluded.

That opinion, however, has never been tested in court and, according to one legal scholar, a due process challenge brought by participants would be likely to succeed because regulation of fantasy sports leagues "poses unreasonable infringement on economic liberties."

Humphrey says "the Internet boom of the late 1990s changed the theretofore predominantly social and entertainment nature" of fantasy sports. But it's still fantasy to suggest players are like gamblers who bet on the outcome of a horse race or a hand of cards.

Ironically, the pending legislation in Congress does not exempt online poker from the Internet gambling prohibition.

8/3/06

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poker defined as game of skill


Anti-Gay T-Shirt Case Heats Up 9th Circuit

The case of a California high-school student barred from wearing an anti-gay t-shirt on campus has taken an ironic turn as five conservative members of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals accused their most liberal colleague of censorship.

The court's liberal flag-bearer, Judge Stephen Reinhardt, wrote for the 2-1 majority in a controversial April 20 opinion that found the student's sartorial expression of his views was not protected by the First Amendment. The back of the t-shirt proclaimed, "Homosexuality Is Shameful."

This week, Reinhardt returned to the fray, exchanging barbs with conservative Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, as the full 9th Circuit announced it would not reconsider the case of Harper v. Poway Unified School Dist.

In a dissent signed by four other conservatives, O'Scannlain said the panel majority had perpetrated an "unprecedented" expansion of the U.S. Supreme Court's Tinker standard, which limits protections for student speech.

"[U]nder the panel majority’s decision, school administrators are now free to give one side of debatable public questions a free pass while muzzling voices raised in opposition," O'Scannlain complained, and

No Supreme Court decision empowers our public schools to engage in such censorship.

Reinhardt shot back, saying that "The dissenters still don’t get the message -- or Tinker!" and suggesting they are "simply insensitive to the injury that public scorn and ridicule can cause young minority students."

EDITORIAL COMMENT ... "Public schools should not be at once assisting an advocacy group in drawing attention to the plight of gay and lesbian students and forbidding those with deep religious objections from wearing a shirt expressing their feelings." (Washington Post)

In May, the full 9th Circuit also voted to deny rehearing of another Reinhardt decision related to speech in schools. Fields v. Palmdale School Dist. held that a student survey containing questions about sexual matters did not violate the right of parents to control the upbringing of their children.

Also On Harper v. Poway Unified

8/1/06

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7th Circuit Ruling Chilling to Abused Minors?

The 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals failed to consider the potentially chilling implications of a decision that allows employers to make "inquiries into the maturity" of minors suing them for sexual harassment.

In the case of a 16-year-old ice-cream store worker who had sex with her supervisor, the court held that consent is not a defense to liability because the plaintiff was below the age of consent when the alleged harassment occurred. The supervisor, Matt Nayman, was convicted of statutory rape.

"Congress may have felt that to recognize such a defense in a [Title VII] discrimination case would be 'blaming the victim' with a vengeance," Judge Richard A. Posner noted in the opinion.

But Posner, one of the country's most eminent judges, went on to say that in the damages phase of a trial, Oberweis Dairy "should be permitted to put Nayman’s conduct in perspective" by arguing contributory negligence.

The harm suffered by the plaintiff, identified only as Jane Doe, could be "minimal" if she was "sneaking around behind her mother’s -- and her employer’s -- back and thus facilitating Nayman’s behavior," Posner said, and

Though inquiries into the maturity of individual minors are ... bound to be fraught with uncertainty, a jury should be able to sort out the difference between an employer’s causal contribution to the statutory rape by its employee of a 16-year-old siren (if that turns out to be an accurate description of Doe) and to similar conduct toward, say, a 12-year-old.

The likely effect of this ruling, nevertheless, is to open the door to a "blame the victim" strategy. What's to stop defense counsel from inquiring into the victim's sexual history to establish whether she is a "siren" or not?

Posner's suggestion that Doe may have facilitated or contributed to her abuse is also disturbing. The criminal law recognizes that those below the age of consent are too immature to be held accountable for sexual activity with adults and the victim in a civil case should have the same protection.

Also On Contributory Negligence

7/31/06

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Timid Judge Lets State Secrets Trump Privacy

The Bush administration's effort to squelch cases related to NSA surveillance activities would have suffered two defeats in less than a week if U.S. District Judge Matthew F. Kennelly of Chicago had shown a little more backbone.

Kennelly expressed doubts about the government's argument that a case filed by the ACLU on behalf of AT&T customers should be dismissed under the state secrets privilege to protect national security.

The plaintiffs, led by author Studs Terkel, allege AT&T violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act by providing records of phone calls to the NSA's super-snoopers.

But in a July 25 opinion, Kennelly held that the case "implicates the state secrets privilege" and is distinguishable from Hepting v. AT&T, in which a San Francisco judge five days earlier found the same privilege does not apply to a case involving the monitoring of the content of phone calls.

While U.S. District Judge Vaughn R. Walker said the existence of the monitoring program, having been confirmed by President Bush and others, is "hardly a secret," Kennelly said media reports about the alleged disclosure of phone call records "amount to nothing more than unconfirmed speculation."

"[T]he Court is persuaded that requiring AT&T to confirm or deny whether it has disclosed large quantities of telephone records to the federal government could give adversaries of this country valuable insight into the government’s intelligence activities," Kennelly concluded.

That "unconfirmed speculation," however, is surely more than enough to convince any adversary to avoid using AT&T's services, particularly when added to the confirmation of the monitoring program and the very specific disclosures by Qwest, another phone service provider.

According to counsel for former Qwest CEO Joseph Nacchio, the government repeatedly approached Nacchio seeking access to phone records, but he refused after learning that the feds had no legal authority to support their demands.

Kennelly discounted the Qwest disclosures because Terkel "concerns AT&T, not any other telephone companies." But it doesn't take much to infer that AT&T, the nation's largest provider, was involved in the same program.

In Hepting, Walker said "dismissing this case at the outset would sacrifice liberty for no apparent enhancement of security." Kennelly should have steeled his nerves and used that same balancing test to keep Terkel alive.

Also On NSA Lawsuits

7/30/06

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Distress Claim Allowed in Dog Stomping Case

Claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress are not limited to those asserted by bystanders, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of a four-year-old boy whose pet dog was stomped to death by a 13-year-old neighbor.

The teenager allegedly jumped and landed with both feet on the dog while playing with the younger boy in Superior, Wisc. Citing the four-year-old's direct involvement in the incident, a trial court judge refused to let his family plead a claim for NIED.

But the appeals court said the judge had interpreted a 1994 precedent too narrowly. In Bowen v. Lumbermens Mutual, 517 N.W.2d 432, the estate of a boy killed when his bicycle collided with a vehicle sought damages for the emotional distress he suffered by being aware of the imminent collision.

"Bowen acknowledged a direct claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, but rejected that particular claim on public policy grounds,” the appeals court stressed in Camp v. Anderson.

Judge Gregory A. Peterson, writing for the court, said the plaintiffs could not recover damages for the distress the four-year-old suffered as a bystander to the stomping because a dog is “property” under the law. The direct claim involves the lurid allegation that, at one point, the teenager chased the other boy with a feces-covered cattail.

7/29/06

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Month of Misery for Same-Sex Marriage Cause

Today's 5-4 decision of the Washington state Supreme Court to uphold the state's Defense of Marriage Act completes a thoroughly miserable month in the courts for advocates of same-sex marriage.

Since July 6, as the table below illustrates, five state high courts and a federal appeals court have ruled against gays and lesbians who wish to marry. Whatever momentum the same-sex marriage cause had coming out of a landmark 2003 victory in Massachusetts has come to a screeching halt.

In Washington state, trial court judges in King and Thurston Counties had struck down the 1998 law defining marriage as the union between a man and a woman because it denied the plaintiffs the fundamental right to marry.

But the Supreme Court found the law constitutional, with the plurality opinion clinging to the illusion that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples is reasonably related to promoting procreation and family stability.

Justice Mary E. Fairhurst chastised the majority in a dissent, saying they had "condone[d] blatant discrimination ... in the name of encouraging procreation" and questioning how "giving same-sex couples the same right that opposite-sex couples enjoy injure[s] the State’s interest in procreation and healthy child rearing."

"[T]here is no logical way that denying the right to marry to same-sex couples will encourage heterosexual couples to procreate with greater frequency," she pointed out.

Of course, there may be little room for logic in the same-sex marriage arena. And if same-sex marriage advocates lose pending cases in California and New Jersey, that Massachusetts decision in Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003), will go down as one of legal history's great anomalies.

IN DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE?
Case Court Decision
Hernandez v. Robles New York Court of Appeals (7/6/06) State Constitution "does not compel recognition of marriages between members of the same sex."
Perdue v. O'Kelley Georgia Supreme Court (7/6/06) Technical challenge to constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage denied.
Schulman v. Attorney General Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (7/10/06) Technical challenge to referendum on same-sex marriage ban denied.
ACLU v. Darnell Tennessee Supreme Court  (7/14/06) Technical challenge to referendum on same-sex marriage ban denied.
Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals (7/14/06) Nebraska's same-sex marriage ban "rationally related to legitimate state interests."
Andersen v. King County Washington state Supreme Court (7/26/06) Defense of Marriage Act "bears a reasonable relationship to legitimate state interests -- procreation and child-rearing."

7/26/06

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Court Dilutes Protection for Disabled Workers

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has given employers a green light to fire mentally disabled employees for workplace misconduct even if the disability caused the misconduct.

"[A]n employer does not violate [state discrimination law] by terminating an employee for egregious misconduct stemming from any recognized handicap (as opposed to termination for the handicap itself)," the court said in the case of a former Harvard University employee who has bipolar disorder.

The school fired Michael Mammone from his position as a Peabody Museum staff assistant after he verbally abused administrators while suffering an episode of mania.

Under the earlier precedent of Garrity v. United Airlines, 421 Mass. 55 (1995), a handicapped employee who engages in egregious workplace misconduct can be held to the same standard as a nonhandicapped employee who engages in similar misconduct.

Mammone argued that Garrity applies only to misconduct resulting from drug or alcohol dependence. But Justice Robert J. Cordy, writing for a 5-1 majority, refused to create "significantly different levels of disqualifying disability-related misconduct based on whether the misconduct stems from alcoholism or some other disability."

The opinion affirmed a trial judge's summary dismissal of Mammone's claims that he was terminated because of his disability.

In a dissent, Justice John M. Greaney said a reasonable jury could conclude that

the conduct for which the plaintiff was terminated was not "egregious misconduct," but rather a manifestation of his bipolar disorder, an illness over which he had no control and which was aggravated by confrontational treatment by a supervisor who should have known better.

"The court's decision will make life even more difficult for those attempting to hold down a job while suffering with a mental illness," Greaney warned.

The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals recently took a more humane approach to a similar issue in Dark v. Curry County, which reversed summary dismissal of the case of an Oregon truck driver who was fired after suffering an epileptic seizure on the job.

"[W]ith few exceptions, conduct resulting from a disability is considered to be part of the disability, rather than a separate basis for termination," the court said, quoting from its earlier decision in Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128 (2001).

Groups including the National Disability Rights Network supported Mammone. If the Garrity rule applies to his case, they said in an amicus brief, "individuals with mental health disorders ... will be vulnerable to irrational prejudice harbored by their employers."

7/25/06

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Failure to Back Up Files Costs Screenwriter

An aspiring screenwriter who lost some of his work when a phone company technician installed DSL on his computer will net only $27,000 in damages after a California appeals court ruled he was negligent in failing to back up and protect his data.

A jury awarded Nicholas Boyd $60,000 in compensatory damages and $33,000 in punitives, finding the SBC technician negligently deleted files from his computer during the installation. A data recovery specialist was unable to recover entire drafts of two of his screenplays.

Boyd argued on appeal that the compensatory award was insufficient, particularly as a German production company had agreed to pay him $2.7 million for three scripts, and he was entitled to 100 percent of the award. The jury decided he was 55 percent at fault for his losses.

But in an unpublished opinion, the 2nd District Court of Appeal affirmed the award and said the jury's finding of contributory negligence was reasonable.

The plaintiff, who admitted backing up one script on a floppy disk, "could have easily backed up his other work on floppy disk, but he neglected to do so," the court noted.

Worse still for Boyd, the panel tossed the punitives award, ruling that "The jury’s finding of fraud, oppression or malice was not permissible."

7/25/06

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Court Won't Unring Bell in Judge's Bias Case

In a highly technical reading of a jurisdictional issue, a federal appeals court has found that an Oklahoma Supreme Court justice who accused his colleagues of age discrimination does not have a remediable injury.

Marian R. Opala filed his unusual suit in order to undo the result of the court's November 2004 election for chief justice. The incumbent, Joseph M. Watt, was reelected to another two-year term after the court changed the eligibility rule.

Under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), state officials are not immune from being sued in federal court if, among other things, the plaintiff is seeking prospective –- not retroactive -– injunctive relief.

Opala said that exception to sovereign immunity applied to his case against his eight colleagues because he was seeking to end an "ongoing violation" of his rights by reinstating the old rule.

U.S. District Judge Clarence A. Brimmer last year denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. But the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said his analysis of the jurisdictional issue was "incomplete" and threw out the case.

"Any remedy the federal courts could fashion would not redress Justice Opala’s injury," the opinion said, because a declaration that the new eligibility rule is unconstitutional "would not place Justice Opala in the position he was in on November 3, 2004."

At the time of the election, Opala was vice-chief justice and, under the old rule, would have been first in line for chief. "There is no prospective remedy that can unring that bell," the court concluded.

Opala did not attend the meeting at which the other justices adopted the rule change and duly voted for Watt, choosing to sit it out in protest.

The logic of the 10th Circuit's decision is Opala should have sued for an injunction blocking the vote. But it is unclear how he could have done that under the circumstances.

Also On Opala v. Watt

7/24/06

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Border 'Vigilante' Beats Civil Trespassing Case

Immigrants rights activists might need to adjust their legal strategy after an Arizona jury found that alleged border vigilante Roger Barnett did not trespass on a neighbor's property while he detained a group of Mexican migrants.

The Tucson-based Border Action Network (BAN), which accuses Barnett of mistreating immigrants he has rounded up on his Cochise County ranch since the late 1990s, has helped bring lawsuits against the rancher in state and federal court.

In the first case to go to trial, Donald Mackenzie, manager of the Wind Tree Ranch, alleged that in October 2003 he found three armed individuals dressed as Border Patrol agents with about 30 migrants at the water well on his property. He realized only later that he had, in fact, encountered Barnett, his brother Donald and wife Barbara.

"[The Barnetts] came to the well to keep and capture prey, and nobody allowed them to be there for that purpose," plaintiff's counsel Jesus Romo Véjar, who is affiliated with BAN, said in his closing argument.

But it took a Cochise County Superior jury only 15 minutes to reach a verdict in favor of the Barnetts, who claimed they were dressed as civilians and denied that they captured the migrants at the well.

Jurors said immigration politics did not influence their decision. But Donald Barnett's lawyer certainly played the immigration card when he told the jury that people like Mackenzie who put out water stations might be encouraging migrants to cross the border illegally.

Romo Véjar, moreover, may have erred in not seeking a change in venue from Cochise County, where immigration is such a hot-button issue and Barnett has plenty of sympathizers.

"All you need is a couple of sympathetic people on the jury and you’re dead," a former Arizona judge told the Sierra Vista Herald.

In a second BAN-supported case set for trial in October, a Cochise County man alleges Barnett threatened him and his young daughters with an assault rifle after accusing them of trespassing on his land.

The plaintiffs, BAN says on its Web site, will "take the stand to talk about the nightmares, fears and damage caused by the Barnett brothers" and "expect that lessons learned from the Mackenzie trial will help justice stand up against outrageous vigilante activities on the border."

One of those lessons might be to get the trial out of Cochise County.

7/7/06

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'Alleged Cheater' Turns On Dating Gossip Site

A Pittsburgh attorney likely will get nowhere with his libel suit against the operator of DontDateHimGirl.com because the derogatory comments about him in its online forum were posted by third parties.

Todd J. Hollis' complaint alleges that as the owner and operator of the site, Tasha Joseph had a duty to "properly investigate the subject matter of the defamatory statements prior to publishing them."

UPDATE ... Joseph has moved for dismissal of the case, citing the protections of the Communications Decency Act.

DontDateHimGirl promotes itself as a site that "lets women publicly out the men who allegedly cheat on them." The anonymous comments about Hollis ranged from "he's a DOG" and "Often dresses shabbily for a lawyer" to "He gave me an STD" and "His crib is a dump."

Joseph ''has created a very malicious communications medium,'' plaintiff's counsel told the Miami Herald.  "She has to know what it has become -- that it is being used for vindictive purposes."

But the defense will certainly argue that Joseph is protected under the federal Communications Decency Act, which applies broadly to Internet content providers who do not exercise editorial control over third-party postings.

As additional anti-libel insurance, DontDateHimGirl identifies each man in its database as an "alleged" cheater and, in a block of flashing text, invites men to "tell us your side of the story."

EDITORIAL COMMENT ... "Suing is one thing in the case of the Mt. Lebanon [Pa.] teen-ager who is described in the vilest of sexual terms in a 'Top 25' list that was e-mailed and distributed directly to her friends and acquaintances. But suing for defamation by a 38-year-old man portrayed in much tamer terms on a Web site makes the lawyer look as ridiculous as the descriptions of him on the Web site." (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette)

7/5/06

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HIV Infection Ruling Opens 'Pandora's Box'?

A sharply divided California Supreme Court today opened what a dissenter called "a Pandora's box" in recognizing the tort of negligent transmission of HIV.

A 4-3 majority of the court found liability for infecting a sexual partner extends not only to someone who knows he has the virus, but also "to those situations where the actor, under the totality of circumstances, has reason to know of the infection."

Under that "constructive knowledge" standard, the plurality opinion of Justice Marvin R. Baxter said, an HIV-positive woman identified as Bridget B. who claims she was infected by her husband is entitled to question him about whether he engaged in unprotected, extra-marital sex and had symptoms consistent with HIV infection.

But two justices argued strongly in favor of limiting liability to cases of actual knowledge, with Justice Carlos R. Moreno slamming the majority for ignoring the unique context of HIV and "rushing into the complex terrain that constitutes AIDS policy."

The "novel cause of action for transmission of HIV based on a constructive knowledge standard," he warned in his dissent,

potentially licenses invasions into the sexual privacy of all sexually active Californians and may even invite abuse of the judicial process ... [W]ith this decision the majority has opened a Pandora’s box.

In a concurrence, Justice Joyce L. Kennard saw "no need to decide the level of knowledge necessary to trigger the tort duty," saying the "ordinary test of relevance" was applicable to discovery in the case.

Bridget B. tested positive for HIV in October 2000, only three months after marrying John B. The Supreme Court majority limited discovery to the six-month period preceding August 2000, when John B. tested negative, because the latency period for development of HIV antibodies is believed to be no longer than six months.

ON POINT shares Moreno's concern that constructive knowledge is simply too loose and vague a standard to apply to such a sensitive area as HIV infection.

The following table shows how the seven justices split on the appropriate standard for the tort of negligent transmission of HIV:

Justice Actual Knowledge Constructive Knowledge Quote
Marvin Baxter Yes

Yes

 

"[T]he tort of negligent transmission of HIV does not depend solely on actual knowledge of HIV infection and would extend at least to those situations where the actor, under the totality of the circumstances, has reason to know of the infection."

 

Ming Chin

Yes

Yes

Carol Corrigan Yes

Yes

Ronald George Yes

Yes

Joyce Kennard No

No

"I see no need to decide the level of knowledge necessary to trigger the tort duty."

Carlos Moreno Yes

No

"This cause of action potentially licenses invasions into the sexual privacy of all sexually active Californians."

Kathryn Werdegar Yes

No

"[T]his court is ill equipped and ill advised to venture into an area the Legislature already has extensively addressed."

7/3/06

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Aide Follows Dots, Claims Brando Will Fake

Marlon Brando was "incapable of signing anything" on the day he changed his will and gave control of his $22 million estate to former movie studio chief Mike Medavoy and two other executors, Brando's caregiver alleges in an explosive fraud complaint.

Angela Borlaza says she was present when accountant Larry Dressler and attorney Charles A. Larson came to Brando's Beverly Hills home on June 18, 2004 –- less than two weeks before the Hollywood legend died. The visitors "told [Borlaza] they were there to change the will," the Los Angeles County Superior Court complaint says.

In a codicil to the will which bears Brando's signature, he removed longtime retainers Jo An Corrales and Alice Marshak as his executors, replacing them with Medavoy, Dressler (who is Medavoy's brother-in-law), and Avra Douglas (a friend of Brando's daughter Rebecca).

But according to Borlaza, Brando was "incapacitated, confused, medicated and non-communicative at the time of the alleged signing ceremony" and she never saw him sign any documents. Moreover, having been trained by Brando to recognize his signature, Borlaza "is informed and believes" that he did not sign the codicil on June 18, 2004.

Brando apparently used a "secret code" to authenticate his signature, placing "certain dots (.....) between various letters of his name" when signing documents.

The "Marlon Brando Sr" signature on the Aug. 28, 2002 will shows dots inside the "B" and the "S"; the equivalent signature on the codicil does not.

Brando "lacked the mental capacity required to understand what was transpiring at his residence on June 18, 2004," Borlaza insists.

The plaintiff, who started working for Brando as a cook in 1995, claims that as a result of the change in executors, she was defrauded out of a San Fernando Valley house that Brando had bought for her.

Brando's holding company had title to the home, but, Borlaza says, Corrales knew it was rightfully hers and

had Corrales been allowed to serve as the executor of the Decedent's estate and had a fraud not been perpetrated on the Creditors, Beneficiaries, Interested Parties and the Court, as a result of the offering of the June 18, 2004 codicil into probate, title to the property would have been transferred into the Plaintiff's name by Corrales.

Since Brando's death, the executors, represented by Larson, have sold off many of his assets. Most controversially, they made a $2-million deal with a Tahiti-based businessman who plans to develop Brando's beloved South Pacific island, Tetiaroa, as an "eco-resort."

Brando "had a large estate and being in control of his estate was and is a prestigious job and valuable job," Borlaza's suit says, alleging that the executors "have received and will continue to receive, for years to come, substantial financial gain for controlling the Marlon Brando empire."

7/1/06

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High Court Backs Prison's 'Mind Control' Rule

In its latest assault on civil rights, the U.S. Supreme Court has given the green light to prison officials to impose even the most draconian of restrictions on inmates in the name of the deprivation theory of rehabilitation.

Under Turner v. Staley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), restrictive prison rules are permissible if they are "'reasonably related' to legitimate penological interests" and are not an "exaggerated response" to such objectives.

But a majority of the High Court made what a dissenter called only a "peremptory" effort to apply that test to a rule forbidding "worst of the worst" inmates in Pennsylvania's Long Term Segregation Unit (LTSU) all access to newspapers, magazines, and photographs.

Summarily dismissing the challenge of an inmate, the plurality opinion authored by "liberal" Justice Stephen G. Breyer abjectly deferred to a prison official's "professional judgment that the Policy deprived 'particularly difficult' inmates of a last remaining privilege and that doing so created a significant behavioral incentive."

In a dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens noted the complete lack of evidence that the deprivation theory of behavior modification "has any basis in human psychology, or that the challenged rule has in fact had any rehabilitative effect on LTSU inmates."

"[T]he rule comes perilously close to a state-sponsored effort at mind control," he concluded.

Behavior modification "could be recited, routinely, to immunize all manner of prison regulations from review for rationality," agreed Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the other dissent.

The ruling basically leaves the First Amendment rights of inmates protected in only one area. Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), prison regulations that impact freedom of religion are subject to the heightened strict scrutiny standard of review.

The shadow of RLUIPA explains why prison officials allow LTSU inmates to receive The Jewish Daily Forward, which is deemed to be a religious publication, and not the Christian Science Monitor.

But doesn't an inmate's right to have personal photographs deserve as much protection as the right to read religious literature? As Stevens put it,

[T]he ban on personal photographs, for at least some inmates, interferes with the capacity to remember loved ones, which is undoubtedly a core part of a person’s “sphere of intellect and spirit.”

6/30/06

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Elevator Ordeal May Test Ariz. Negligence Law

Celia and Jesus Escalante spent 45 minutes trapped in an elevator with a dead man on its roof. Now they could be stuck without a legal remedy for the emotional distress of their ordeal.

The Tucson, Ariz., couple were stranded after the descending elevator car they were riding in a Pima County office building struck and killed an elevator mechanic in June 2004. David Woodrow, who had been peering into the open shaft, landed on top of the car.

The Escalantes' ordeal turned into something out of an Edgar Allan Poe story. "[T]hey observed blood sipping [sic] into the elevator and covering part of the walls of the elevator," they allege in a negligence suit against Otis Elevator Co.

As a result of the gory experience, the complaint says, the plaintiffs have suffered a "great amount of anguish, trauma and stress." But Arizona law is unclear as to whether they can recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress absent physical injury or illness.

In a case arising out of exposure to asbestos, Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals denied an emotional distress claim, finding "no evidence tending to establish the existence of any physical harm or medically identifiable effect." Destories v. City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705 (1987).

But Division Two upheld a $1.5 million jury award to a man who was incorrectly treated for an elevated red blood cell count with a radioactive drug. The patient's treatment, the court said in Monaco v. Healthpartners of Southern Arizona, 995 P.2d 735 (1999),

resulted in substantial, long-term emotional disturbances sufficient to support the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Two elevator trauma cases suggest the Escalantes may not be able to satisfy the Monaco standard:

  • In Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765 (1983), the Missouri Supreme Court expressed doubt as to whether "an ordinary person normally constituted would succumb to serious emotional distress by reason of being trapped in a stalled elevator."

  • In Lewis v. Westinghouse Electric, 487 N.E.2d 1071 (1985), the Illinois Court of Appeals said a woman trapped in an elevator for 40 minutes "did not have a reasonable fear for her own safety."

The plaintiffs in those lawsuits, however, were not trapped in an elevator with blood leaking through the roof.

6/28/06

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Court Denies Boaters The 'Right to a View'

A coastal property owner won a landmark victory today as a California appeals court ruled that the state could not require him to accommodate "the occasional boater's 'right to a view'" of the shoreline.

The state Coastal Commission had no authority to impose development conditions on the landowner in order to protect offshore vantage points, the 2nd District Court of Appeal said in a case of first impression. Dennis Schneider wants to build a 10,000-square-foot bluff-top home in San Luis Obispo County.

The California Coastal Act protects "views to and along the ocean and scenic coastal areas." In June 2005, a trial court judge said limiting the reach of the law to onshore vantage points defies common sense and that "the beauty of a sunrise from a vantage point offshore is afforded the same protection as a sunset seen from land."

But the appeals court showed no such aesthetic refinement in refusing to subordinate "a landowner's real property rights to the occasional boater's 'right to a view' of the coastline."

Interpreting the statute to include views from the ocean "stretches the fabric too thin," the opinion said, concluding that it applies only to "land-based scenic views from public parks, trails, roads and vista points."

Schneider wanted the court to reinstate the original permit that the county issued him in 2000. The 2nd District would not go that far, ordering the commission to "rehear the matter consistent with this opinion."

6/28/06

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Nick Nolte Settles Rape Victim's Premises Case

Taking the low-profile way out of a tawdry legal mess, actor Nick Nolte has reached a settlement with a teenage girl who was sexually assaulted during a party at his Malibu estate.

A judge's decision last month to deny Nolte summary judgment on the girl's premises liability claims had left the star facing the unappetizing prospect of a high-profile trial which was scheduled to start July 3.

Court records show the Jane Doe plaintiff was hoping to introduce evidence of Nolte's own drug-related run-ins with the law to support her case. His son Brawley was a co-defendant, accused, among other things, of filming the victim performing a sex act.

The elder Nolte was not present at the January 2003 party where a guest, Nicholas Woodring, committed the sexual assault.

In the summary judgment motion, the defense argued that the plaintiff's "own alleged intoxication" was the proximate cause of her injuries. Jane Doe, however, blamed Nolte for "creat[ing] an attractive dangerous condition" by allowing minors to use alcohol and drugs on his premises.

Also On Doe v. Nolte

6/27/06

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Melvin and Howard: The Courtroom Sequel

In a sequel to one of the all-time great probate battles, a former gas station operator is alleging that a "shirt-tail relative" and a top aide of Howard Hughes conned him out of a $156 million share of the reclusive billionaire's estate.

Hughes supposedly wrote a will naming Melvin Dummar as a beneficiary a few months after Dummar found him lying face down on a Nevada desert road in late December 1967, woke him up and then drove him 160 miles to Las Vegas.

But a jury denied Dummar's probate claim in 1978, ruling the so-called Mormon will was a fake. A cousin of Hughes, William Lummis, became the sole beneficiary after Hughes was declared intestate.

Now Dummar, 61, has come back for a second brush with fame –- or folly. In a federal suit filed in Utah, he claims Lummis and Frank Gay, former head of Hughes's holding company, fraudulently deprived him of a fair trial and his "rightful inheritance."

"[I]n perpetrating the fraud," the complaint says, the defendants pressured Hughes employees to testify falsely that "Hughes never left his penthouse suite at The Desert Inn [in Las Vegas] during the time period between Christmas and New Year's Eve of 1967."

In fact, Dummar claims, Hughes flew to central Nevada during that time for the "sexual services of a female prostitute" at the Cottontail Ranch brothel. "Mr. Hughes was found by Plaintiff Dummar at a location within miles of the brothel," the suit says.

The bordello evidence apparently came to light in 2004 when Hughes's pilot, Robert Deiro, contacted Dummar. Deiro has said he flew Hughes to the Cottontail for a regular tryst with a diamond-toothed redhead and returned to Las Vegas without him.

"The ongoing effectiveness" of non-disclosure agreements had previously made it impossible to confirm Dummar's rescue story, the plaintiff says.

Dummar seeks not only the $156 million claim plus interest, but also triple damages for RICO violations. But even if Deiro is credible and Melvin really did save Howard, that may not be enough to prove that the Mormon will is authentic.

6/26/06

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Feds' New Absurdity: A 'Reasonable Terrorist'

The Bush administration has plumbed new depths of absurdity by asserting a "reasonable terrorist" standard in seeking the dismissal of an electronic privacy suit on state secrets grounds.

At a hearing last week in San Francisco, Chief U.S. District Judge Vaughn R. Walker honed in on a key issue in the proposed class action which alleges AT&T invaded customers' privacy by allowing the NSA to monitor phone and data traffic.

How would litigation of the case damage national security, Vaughn reasonably wondered, if the alleged cooperation of AT&T and other telecom companies in warrantless surveillance has been widely reported in the press?

Assistant Attorney General Peter Keisler responded with the tired line that public confirmation or denial of AT&T's involvement would allow terrorists to replace suspicion with certainty.

Then came Keisler's kicker. As the San Francisco Chronicle reports:

A "reasonable terrorist" deciding how to contact cohorts weighs the risk that communications on a commercial network will be intercepted against the difficulties of finding other channels, Keisler said. By clarifying AT&T's status, he said, "you are enabling them to communicate more securely and more efficiently."

So now our enemies in the so-called War on Terror -- who are, by definition, totally unreasonable when they kill and maim -- morph into "reasonable terrorists" when they contemplate how to communicate with each other.

Hopefully, none of this nonsense will sway Judge Walker. In an order before the hearing, he indicated some skepticism with the government's position.

"If this litigation reveals that AT&T has received a certification and is involved in some kind of surveillance program," he asked, "might the risk to national security of disclosure of the certification be de minimis and not outweigh plaintiffs’ due process rights?"

Also On Wiretap Suits

6/25/06

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Tardy Filing Knocks Out FBI Scandal Lawsuit

The 1st U.S Circuit Court of Appeals is continuing to add to its list of plaintiffs who have run afoul of the statute of limitations in cases resulting from corrupt ties between organized crime and the FBI's Boston office.

The latest plaintiffs to be timed out of recovering damages from the feds for civil-rights violations are two women whose father, Edward “Teddy” Deegan, was the victim of a mob hit in 1965.

Catherine Deegan Patterson and her sister Yvonne Deegan Gioka filed an administrative claim in December 2003. That put them outside the two-year statute of limitations, assuming their claims accrued with the publication of a Boston Globe article.

The newspaper disclosed in December 2000 that FBI agents were told about the plot to kill Deegan two days before the murder but did nothing to stop it. The hitmen -- Vincent Flemmi and Joseph Barboza –- were both FBI informants at the time.

The plaintiffs argued that the statute should toll because the publicity about the case was centered mainly in the Boston area. Gioka lives in Georgia.

But the 1st Circuit said the plaintiffs had "constructive knowledge" of the publicity, noting that the Boston stories were picked up by national media. "[T]he fact that Gioka resided in Georgia in December 2000-January 2001 is insufficient to vitiate a finding that she should have learned of the news at that time," the opinion said.

In March, the same court dismissed as time-barred the claims of a couple who alleged that the FBI sheltered two notorious Boston mobsters who extorted ownership of a liquor store from them. James "Whitey" Bulger, boss of the Winter Hill Gang, and associate Stephen Flemmi, Vincent's brother, were also informants.

All the civil suits related to the FBI/mob scandal have faced a similar problem -– the feds' involvement in the underlying crime was not disclosed until many years after the event. As the table below illustrates, only one case has avoided being dismissed under the statute of limitations by the 1st Circuit.

FRUITS OF CORRUPTION
Case Underlying Crime Disposition
Callahan v. U.S., 426 F.3d 444 (2005) Winter Hill Gang hitman murders businessman John Callahan in 1982. Dismissed as time-barred (claim filed in 2002).
Deegan Patterson v. U.S. (2006) Two mobsters murder Edward "Teddy" Deegan in 1965. Dismissed as time-barred (claims filed in 2003).
McIntyre v. U.S., 367 F.3d 38 (2004) Winter Hill Gang murders police informant John McIntyre in 1984. Case allowed to proceed under discovery rule (claim filed in 2000).
Rakes v. U.S., 442 F.3d 7 (2006) Winter Hill Gang forces couple to sell liquor store in 1984. Dismissed as time-barred (claim filed in 2001).
Wheeler v. U.S., 367 F.3d 38 (2004) Winter Hill Gang hitman murders Oklahoma businessman Roger Wheeler in 1981. Dismissed as time-barred (claim filed in 2001).

6/25/06

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California Bill Tightens Judicial Eligibility Rule

California lawmakers wasted little time in reacting to the shock electoral defeat of an incumbent judge by an attorney who had been on "inactive" status while running a bagel store.

Under current law, attorneys seeking a judgeship need only be members of the Bar for the 10 years preceding their selection. Assembly Bill 2519, as amended this week, requires that they have at least 10 years as an active member.

On June 6, businesswoman Lynn D. Olson defeated Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Dmitra Janavs, becoming the first challenger to oust an incumbent jurist in a countywide election in 18 years. While Olson was admitted to the Bar in 1989, she had been on active status for only 6-1/2 years.

Despite the election result, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger kept Janavs on the bench by appointing her to a vacant judgeship.

6/23/06

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Missouri Ruling A Bad 'Twist' for Free Speech

The Missouri Court of Appeals clearly overstepped the First Amendment line in questioning whether a comic book author had "artistic motivations" when he named a character for a professional hockey player.

Todd McFarlane, author of the "Spawn" series, lost his appeal of a $15 million jury award as the court found he infringed on the publicity rights of former NHL enforcer Tony Twist. He claimed the First Amendment protected his use of Twist's name for a gangster character.

"The predominant purpose of the use of the name 'Tony Twist' was to sell comic books and related products and not to make an expressive comment about Twist the hockey player," the opinion authored by Chief Judge Glenn A. Norton concluded.

The court reached this conclusion after finding that the evidence that McFarlane "used Twist's name and identity to gain a commercial advantage" outweighed the "testimony tending to show that use of the name had an 'expressive component.'"

In the latter regard, McFarlane testified that he was inspired by a gangster enforcer from the 1940s nicknamed Kid Twist and another comic book author who used alliteration in naming characters.

According to Norton, "the timing of McFarlane's claims of artistic motivation is suspicious." Before the filing of the suit, the judge stressed, the author "stated only that the character 'Tony Twist' was named after the hockey player with the same name."

But judges are not literary critics and Norton should never have been probing into McFarlane's motives in the first place. As blogmeister Prof. Eugene Volokh says in an amicus brief related to the case,

First Amendment law does not allow judges and juries to compare the relative weight of the literary and commercial value of a discrete passage or reference in a work.

The decision also conflicts with Comedy III Productions v. Saderup, 25 Cal. 4th 387 (2001), in which the California Supreme Court found that a work is protected if its value "does not derive primarily from the celebrity’s fame."

The Missouri Supreme Court has previously ruled that Twist has a valid publicity rights claim. That leaves the U.S. Supreme Court as McFarlane's best hope for overturning an egregious verdict.

6/22/06

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B < PL = No Case for Goalpost Injury Victim

A college student injured when football fans tore down a goalpost cannot use the venerable "Hand rule" of negligence to recover damages from the manufacturer of the equipment, the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled.

Andrew Bourne claimed in a products liability suit that Gilman Gear was negligent in designing the aluminum goalpost which snapped and fell on him at a Ball State University game in October 2001, leaving him a paraplegic. Fans ripped the post down as part of a victory celebration.

Under Judge Learned Hand's classic formula, Gilman would be liable if its burden (B) of taking precautions was less than the probability (P) of loss and the gravity (G) of loss –- or, in other words, a reasonable alternative design of the goalpost could have prevented Bourne's injuries for less than the cost of those injuries.

But the 7th Circuit refused to let Bourne argue B < PL to a jury, finding he had not presented sufficient evidence that the actual design of the goalpost was defective.

The mere fact that other manufacturers reputedly sell a safer product, the court said in affirming a summary dismissal of the case, "is not sufficient to establish liability."

"Otherwise," the opinion added wryly, "the bare fact of a Volvo would render every KIA defective."

6/21/06

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Did MySpace Have Duty to Protect Teen User?

Plaintiffs seeking at least $30 million in damages in the first MySpace seduction lawsuit must somehow show that the popular Web site has a duty to protect underage users of its social network from adult sexual predators.

The suit, filed this week in Travis County (Texas) District Court, alleges that the failure of MySpace to prevent strangers from contacting users younger than 16 proximately caused the sexual assault of plaintiff Julie Doe, a 14-year-old girl.

According to the petition, Pete Solis, 19, assaulted the teenager in an Austin parking lot May 12, about a month after first contacting her on MySpace where she had a user profile. He had allegedly misrepresented himself to her as a high-school senior.

As their theory of liability, the teen and her mother claim MySpace promoted the site to children –- about 22 percent of visitors are minors -– and "expressly and implicitly represented that their website was safe for young underage users."

Yet despite knowing of other sexual assaults involving underage users, the suit says, MySpace failed in its duty to

institute and enforce appropriate security measures and policies that would substantially decrease the likelihood of danger and harm that MySpace posed to [Julie Doe].

In the only somewhat analogous case, a California teenager sued America Online last year, claiming the Internet provider was liable for the behavior of a chat-room monitor who solicited sexual favors from her.

The question of duty in that case, which settled before any litigation of the merits, was clearer since the alleged seducer was an employee of the service provider and AOL monitored the chat-room communications.

MySpace, on the other hand, is an "open forum" and had no control over the behavior of Solis. Suing MySpace for negligence is "like blaming the post office for the anthrax scare," says Oliver Taillieu, plaintiff's attorney in the AOL case.

Even if Julie Doe does establish that MySpace should have tighter security, another tricky issue is whether its duty extends to what users do away from its "place for friends."

As a legal expert told the Austin American-Statesman, "If you interact on MySpace, you are safe, but if a 13-year-old or 14-year-old goes out in person and meets someone she doesn't know, that is always an unsafe endeavor."

UPDATE ... Defense counsel for accused predator Solis says he will file a cross-complaint against MySpace. "Meeting on MySpace -— if that alone is enough, then we can make the same claim for damages," Adam Reposa tells TIME magazine.

6/20/06

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Parents Battle States Over Kids' Medical Care

Federal courts in Utah and Nebraska are considering highly-charged cases that focus on how to balance state power with the right of parents to make medical care decisions for their children.

The Utah case involves what U.S. District Judge Paul G. Cassell called the "months-long ordeal" of a couple who clashed with state officials and doctors over the treatment of their son after he was diagnosed with a rare form of cancer.

Barbara and Daren Jensen refused to let the boy undergo radical chemotherapy unless a genetic test confirmed he had Ewing's sarcoma.

Parker Jensen

Alleging child neglect, the state began a juvenile court proceeding to remove Parker Jensen from his parents' custody.

In a June 16 ruling, Cassell said the Jensens could proceed with civil-rights claims against two doctors who allegedly misrepresented Parker's condition to the juvenile court, refused to order tests that would have conclusively identified his cancer, and ignored evidence that was inconsistent with their diagnosis.

The right of parents to direct their child's medical care, Cassell noted, is a "fundamental liberty interest" and therefore the state can only infringe on that right "if the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."

The doctors cannot pass that strict level of scrutiny on a motion to dismiss, the judge concluded, since "There is no compelling state interest in falsifying or misrepresenting evidence to a juvenile court."

In Nebraska, a couple who claim to be Scientologists want that same high standard applied to their challenge to the state's infant genetic testing law.

The state requires that infants be tested for certain metabolic disorders within 24 to 48 hours of birth. Unlike other states, Nebraska allows courts to force parents to submit their children to testing.

Louise and Ray Spiering have moved for summary judgment in their suit against the state, contending the statute violates their religious freedom and parental rights and should be subjected to strict scrutiny.

"Absent an 'immediate and substantial threat' to a child’s well-being, the state lacks a compelling governmental interest in superseding parental decisions concerning the medical care and treatment of their children," the motion says.

The Spierings' chances of prevailing, however, look bleak since the Nebraska Supreme Court has upheld the law as constitutional under the less onerous "rational basis" standard.

The U.S. Supreme Court "has never held that parental rights to childrearing as guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment must be subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis," the court observed in Douglas County v. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d 601 (2005).

6/19/06

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$2M Award in Mower Death Called 'Nonsense'

In what may be one of the largest verdicts of its kind, a Virginia jury awarded $2 million to the family of a four-year-old boy who was run over and killed by a lawn mower at his daycare center.

The daycare operator's husband drove the MTD Products mower over Justin Simmons as it rolled backwards on an incline. The blades kept cutting because Orvil Reedy had his foot on the clutch.

MTD, the world's largest mower manufacturer, had equipped the 1988 model with a device that prevents the blades from turning when in reverse gear. But the Roanoke Circuit Court jury found the company liable for not addressing the danger of a mower inadvertently rolling backward with the clutch depressed.

UPDATE ... A Kentucky man has sued Deere & Co., alleging it is liable for injuries suffered by his seven-year-old daughter when he backed over her in a mower that was not equipped with a "no-mow-in-reverse" safety feature. Phillips v. Deere & Co.

The award includes $1 million to Simmons' three-year-old brother and $500,000 to each of his parents. The plaintiffs dropped Reedy and his wife from the case during the trial, leaving MTD as the only defendant.

Defense attorney John Fitzpatrick called the verdict "nonsense," noting that no mower is designed to automatically stop its blades when it rolls backward. "No one has even suggested that as a standard," he told the Roanoke Times.

MTD also argued that the bad judgment of the Reedys was to blame for the tragedy. Roberta Reedy was changing another child's diaper inside her house when the accident happened and her husband had never read the manual for the mower, which instructs users not to depress the clutch while going backwards.

But an unidentified juror strongly defended the verdict on an online message board:

In 1974, MTD knew there was a problem with rollovers and small children ... They also admitted that they could have designed a safety feature that would stop the blades when the mower rolled back.

Prevailing industry standards, moreover, are not necessarily a defense to a products liability claim if the plaintiff presents evidence there was a cost-effective alternative design that would have prevented the risk of injury.

According to a safety advocacy group, a ride-on mower backs over an average of one young child a day in the U.S. But as the table below illustrates, the results of cases involving such accidents have been very variable.

The Simmonses' attorney has said a settlement with the Reedys is likely.

MOWING DOWN KIDS
Case Accident Disposition
Brown v. Sears Roebuck, 328 F.3d 1274 (2003) Utah man backs mower over two-year-old nephew. Summary judgment for defense affirmed.
Burnham v. Sears Roebuck, 856 F.2d 192 (1988) Michigan man backs mower over two-year-old nephew. $600,000 jury award affirmed.
International Harvester v. Hardin, 574 S.W.2d 260 (1978) Arkansas man backs mower over six-year-old girl. $62,500 jury award reversed.
Lease v. International Harvester, 529 N.E.2d 57 (1988) Illinois man backs mower over two-year-old grandson. Directed verdict for defense on strict liability affirmed.
South Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933 (1967) Texas man backs mower over two-year-old boy. $117,000 jury award affirmed.

6/18/06

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James Joyce Scholar Tests Copyright Defense

A James Joyce scholar's lawsuit against the estate of the writer could be a milestone in the development of an affirmative defense to copyright infringement that is gaining favor in the courts.

The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to extend the doctrine of "patent misuse" to copyright law, but Carol Loeb Shloss, the author of a book about Joyce's mentally ill sister, pleads "copyright misuse" in a declaratory relief action filed earlier this week.

Stephen Joyce

Joyce's grandson and only living descendant, Stephen Joyce, has threatened Loeb Shloss with a copyright suit if she publishes an online supplement to "Lucia Joyce: To Dance in the Wake." The supplement would include material from James Joyce's published works and his published and unpublished correspondence.

Loeb Shloss, a professor of English at Stanford University, claims the fair use doctrine covers the material. More innovatively, she also contends in her complaint that the estate "cannot assert copyrights they control" because

Defendants have repeatedly misused their control of copyrights in Joyce's work in an effort to prevent the publication of materials and information about Joyce or the Joyce family over which Defendants have no rights or control.

Misuse does not invalidate a copyright or patent, but "precludes its enforcement during the period of misuse." In copyright cases, misuse has usually been applied to anticompetitive behavior.

But in Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, 342 F.3d 191 (2003), the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the "'ultimate aim' of copyright law is 'to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.'" Misuse could therefore apply to a "copyright holder’s attempt to restrict expression."

7th Circuit luminary Judge Richard A. Posner has also suggested that "copyright overclaiming" should be deemed "a form of copyright misuse, which could result in forfeiture of the copyright."

The plaintiff in Video Pipeline, a distributor of movie trailers, wasn't successful with the misuse defense and there's no precedent for applying it to scholarly creativity. But Loeb Shloss could point to a 2nd Circuit case which held under the "unclean hands" doctrine that Howard Hughes could not stop publication of an unauthorized biography.

"The spirit of the First Amendment applies to the copyright laws at least to the extent that the courts should not tolerate any attempted interference with the public’s right to be informed regarding matters of general interest," a concurring opinion said in Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303 (1966).

6/15/06

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Orwell Lives in Feds' Reply to Wiretap Lawsuit

The Bush administration unleashed all the Orwellian power of the state secrets privilege this week in arguing for the dismissal of an ACLU challenge to the NSA's warrantless eavesdropping program.

During a June 12 hearing, the New York Times reports, U.S. District Judge Anna Diggs Taylor appeared frustrated by the argument that the privilege applies even though the government has publicly defended the program.

"You have conceded, have you not, that a program has been authorized?" she asked government attorney Anthony J. Coppolino.

"There is very much a difference between the existence of an activity and the details of that activity," Coppolino replied.

A Virginia judge last month cited that same "critical distinction" in dismissing the civil-rights case of a man who claims the CIA illegally detained him as part of its clandestine anti-terrorist "renditions" program. Details of the program "are validly claimed as state secrets," the judge ruled.

None of the ACLU plaintiffs, who include lawyers and journalists, alleged in their complaint that they were specific targets of eavesdropping -– and Coppolino made clear that the government wasn't going to enlighten them on that key detail one way or the other.

"The government cannot confirm or deny whether a particular individual is subject to surveillance," he said.

Unless they were subjected to surveillance, the plaintiffs may not be able to show they have suffered an "injury in fact;" without an injury in fact, they cannot show standing to file suit.

Checkmate. Or, as Coppolino put it, "the critical facts necessary to adjudicate" the standing question "are subject to the state secrets privilege."

Also On Wiretap Suits

6/14/06

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Men's Rights Plaintiff Claims 'Privacy Zone'

Amping up the rhetoric in his challenge to Michigan's child-support law, "father's rights" test plaintiff Matthew Dubay is claiming he has a right to choose "to make love without making a baby" that is "impenetrable to state action."

A federal judge in Detroit has set a June 28 hearing on a motion to dismiss filed by the state which argues Dubay's high-profile case has nothing to do with any fundamental rights and is simply a frivolous attempt to avoid his obligation to support the child he conceived with ex-girlfriend Lauren Wells.

In his response to the motion, Dubay says Roe v. Wade bars the state from intruding on "the right to privately engage in consensual sexual activity and the right to privately choose to not be a parent."

He and Wells, the brief continues, were in that "privacy zone" when "they made the choice to make love without making a baby." While Wells "may subsequently change her mind" about being a parent,

the state authority may not subsequently invalidate Matt's choice [not to be a parent] because it was made in a protected space, impenetrable to state action.

The state has pointed out that a man does not have the same rights under Roe as a woman because "it is the woman who physically bears the child." But Dubay contends the right to choose "applies regardless of biology" and cannot survive if "limited only to people with internal reproductive systems."

The plaintiff also makes the startling claim that his case, if successful, would reduce public spending on illegitimate children. "If a woman knows that her potential sexual partner has the choice to not accept parenthood," he reasons, "then it may promote more responsible sexual behavior."

Also On Dubay v. Wells

6/13/06

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Vatican Immunity Pierced in Child Abuse Case

An Oregon judge has for the first time pierced the sovereign immunity of the Vatican in a sexual abuse case, finding it does not apply to the placement of a known child molester in a Portland parish.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) ordinarily protects the Holy See from lawsuits. But there are two exceptions and U.S. District Judge Michael A. Mosman found that one of them -– the "tortious activity" exception –- allows a Seattle-area man allegedly abused by a priest in the mid-1960s to pursue claims for vicarious liability and negligence.

According to the complaint, the Vatican placed Father Andrew Ronan at St. Albert's Church in Portland despite knowing of "Ronan's dangerous propensities to abuse children." He had admitted previously abusing at least four youths while working as a priest in Ireland and Chicago.

"[This is] the first time any court has held or acknowledged there is a basis in law to hold the Holy See accountable for cover up and concealment and this international movement of predatory priests," Jeffrey R. Anderson, co-counsel for the John Doe plaintiff, said.

Denying a motion to dismiss, Mosman reserved his most striking comments for the defense's argument that the FSIA immunity applies because the Vatican made a discretionary policy judgment in transferring Ronan. In 1987, a Mississippi judge dismissed a similar case under the "discretionary function" doctrine.

"Placement of a known child molester in a Portland parish, where he would have unlimited access to young boys for the third time, without warning the new parishioners, is not the kind of discretionary act" that is entitled to FSIA protection, Mosman said in his opinion.

The Vatican immediately filed a notice of appeal. "This decision does not establish jurisdiction over the Holy See, let alone establish liability," its attorney said.

But at the very least, Mosman has given some credibility to suits against the Vatican over molestation by priests, which some legal experts have derided as publicity stunts. A similar case, O'Bryan v. Holy See, is pending in Kentucky.

6/12/06

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Lawyer Sued for Son's Fatal Muscle Car Crash

The parents of a teenager killed in a car accident have sued a wealthy Texas attorney for wrongful death, alleging that Julie Jensen had the "superior intelligence" to know better than to let her 14-year-old son drive a turbo-charged "muscle car."

Jensen's parenting is one of several explosive issues in a case that has rocked rural Vermont. In August 2004, her son, Charles Meyer, lost control of his twin-turbo 1994 Toyota Supra on a state highway, killing two local boys -- Norman Woolard, 16, and Philip Leno, 17 – who had been working at her Vermont summer home.

According to police, Meyer bragged that the car "had 330 horsepower stock and could do 155 mph." Jensen had only given it to him four months before the accident.

In a highly unusual preemptive move, Jensen sued the parents of the dead youths in March, filing for a declaratory judgment clearing her and Meyer of liability or finding Woolard and Leno contributorily negligent.

Neither of the deceased was wearing a seatbelt, the federal court complaint alleged, and Jensen had authorized Woolard, not her son, to drive the car.

But in a counterclaim filed June 5, Leno's parents argue that neither Meyer nor Woolard was skilled or experienced enough to drive an "inherently dangerous" vehicle and that Jensen -- as a "highly experienced, superbly trained" attorney -- owes a higher standard of duty toward the victims.

"The fact that a mother of 'superior intelligence and ability' ... took [the Lenos'] son away from them is atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community," the brief says.

Woolard's mother, Elaine Cashin, has filed her own countersuit against Jensen and Meyer.

The tragedy has inspired some commentary about the social gulf between rich outsiders who summer in Vermont and the working poor who service them. But an attorney for Jensen told the Washington Post that she "has contacts with the northeast kingdom that go back 25 years. She's part of that community."

The Lenos, moreover, allege Jensen, a philanthropist who has donated to community agencies in Vermont, had "specialized knowledge" of

the psychological, social and economic characteristics of the so-called “disadvantaged youth” of the Northeast Kingdom, especially “young males.”

In a confidential juvenile court proceeding, Meyer was charged with grossly negligent operation of an automobile. If Jensen really is so smart and skilled, she should settle the civil litigation before things get even uglier.

6/9/06

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'Hands At Dawn:' Lawyers to Play Kids' Game

If it works for quarrelling kids, why not for bickering lawyers? A Florida judge has ordered counsel in an insurance case to play "rock, paper, scissors" to resolve a procedural dispute.

The plaintiff's attorney had asked U.S. District Judge Gregory A. Presnell to designate a location for a deposition after failing to reach agreement with the defense. Both attorneys have their offices in the same Tampa building.

Noting that the dispute was "the latest in a series of Gordian knots that the parties have been unable to untangle without enlisting the assistance of the federal courts," Presnell fashioned what he called a "new form of alternative dispute resolution."

On June 30, his order says, counsel shall convene at a neutral site of their choosing or in front of the federal courthouse in Tampa and, each accompanied by a paralegal acting as "attendant and witness,"

shall engage in one (1) game of “rock, paper, scissors.”

The contestants are David J. Pettinato (Merlin Law Group) for the plaintiff and D. Lee Craig (Butler Pappas Weihmuller Katz Craig) for the defendant. The winner gets to select the location for the deposition, though the loser, of course, may appeal.

If the attorneys continue to bicker, there's always another form of ADR available to Presnell -- "pistols at dawn."

6/8/06

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Gamble on Race Bias Case Nets $61M Verdict

A San Francisco attorney's gamble on a racial discrimination case paid off handsomely as a jury awarded $61 million to two FedEx Ground drivers whose Lebanese descent made them a target of slurs from a manager.

Edgar Rizkallah and Kamil Issa were turned down by ten law firms and a renowned civil-rights organization before Christopher B. Dolan of the Dolan Law Firm took their case. Dolan is now celebrating the largest single civil-rights judgment under California's employment discrimination law.

"This is a significant statement by the jury, 12 Americans, that harassment of Arabs will not be tolerated," he said.

According to trial testimony, Stacey Shoun, a manager at a FedEx facility in Oakland, routinely taunted Rizkallah and Issa by calling them "camel jockeys," "terrorists," "sand niggers" and other ethnic slurs.

The Alameda County Superior Court jury held Shoun personally liable for $1 million in compensatory damages and $56 in punitives. The entire award breaks down as follows:

Plaintiff

Shoun Damages FedEx Damages
Compensatory Punitive Compensatory Punitive
$500,000 $28 $5,000,000 $25,000,000
Edgar Rizkallah
Kamil Issa $500,000 $28 $5,000,000 $25,000,000

FedEx called the award "wrong and excessive." But the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is well within the range of what the California Supreme Court has recently found acceptable.

Dolan has specialized in motorcycle and other vehicular accident cases. According to his Web site, his previous jury trial best was $2.5 million in damages for an injured motorcyclist.

6/7/06

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Judge Shields 'Poster Child' for Web Vulgarity

In a colorful Internet speech case, a Pennsylvania judge has ruled that a self-proclaimed "asshole" is not liable for allegedly defamatory material posted on his Web site.

Tucker Max, a Duke Law School graduate, uses tuckermax.com to "share my adventures with the world" and host message boards. The subject of several messages was an ill-fated New Year's Eve party hosted in Philadelphia by publicist Anthony DiMeo.

In a libel suit he filed against Max, DiMeo alleged six postings that expressed anger toward him were defamatory, including one that said, "I just wanted to let you know that I think that you are the biggest piece of shit I have ever heard of."

The Communications Decency Act of 1996 shields Internet service providers from liability for material posted on their sites by third parties, but DiMeo argued that Max acted as a content provider by exercising editorial control over postings.

U.S. District Judge Stewart Dalzell disagreed and granted Max's motion to dismiss. "Because DiMeo alleges that Max did no more than select and edit posts, we cannot consider him to be the 'provider' of the 'content' that DiMeo finds to be offensive," the opinion said.

While Max's site could be a "poster child" for vulgarity on the Internet, Dalzell concluded, "'we should also protect the autonomy that such a medium confers to ordinary people as well as media magnates.' Here we do so by protecting the coarse conversation that, it appears, never ends on tuckermax.com."

6/6/06

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No Negligence Claim for Victim of Raging Bull

The New York Court of Appeals has declined to apply a common-law concept of negligence to an animal attack case, leaving a handyman without a remedy for injuries he suffered when he was charged by a stud bull.

Larry Bard claimed the owner of the bull should have protected him from being attacked at an Otsego County farm. The animal was allowed to roam freely in the dairy barn so it could impregnate cows stabled there.

As the Restatement of Torts puts it, the owner of a domestic animal, which the owner does not know or have reason to know to be abnormally dangerous, is nonetheless liable if he negligently fails to prevent harm.

But on a 4-3 vote, the appeals court upheld summary dismissal of the case, declining to "dilute our traditional rule [of strict liability for animal attacks] under the guise of a companion common-law cause of action for negligence."

Under that rule, restated in Collier v. Zambito, 1 NY3d 444 (2004),

the owner of a domestic animal who either knows or should have known of that animal's vicious propensities will be held liable for the harm the animal causes as a result of those propensities.

"Here, [the bull] had never attacked any farm animal or human being” before its assault on Bard, the majority opinion noted.

In a dissent, Judge Robert S. Smith said at least 20 states "appear to follow the Restatement rule" and the court's adoption of the Collier rule as the exclusive measure of liability is "contrary to simple fairness."

"Why should a person who is negligent in managing an automobile or a child be subject to liability," he asked, "and not one who is negligent in managing a horse or bull?"

In another recent animal case, a Manhattan judge ruled that a woman could claim punitive damages for injuries suffered from a dog bite. There was "ample evidence," Supreme Court Judge Joan A. Madden said, from which a trier of fact could infer that the dog's owners "were aware of [its] tendency to bite, but deliberately failed to prevent further incidents." Marsh v. Della Femina

6/6/06

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Scholarly Feud Hinges on 'Replicate' Meaning

A co-author of "Freakonomics" should be able to defeat a libel suit by arguing that the average reader of his best-seller would not ascribe a defamatory meaning to his statement about another economist.

What has been billed as "the highest-profile scholarly defamation battle" since Holocaust denier David Irving sued another historian essentially boils down to the meaning of the word "replicate."

In "Freakonomics," Dr. Steven D. Levitt discusses the theory of Dr. John R. Lott that new laws allowing people to carry concealed weapons have helped reduce crime. While the theory is "admittedly intriguing," Levitt writes,

When other scholars have tried to replicate [Lott's] results, they found that right-to-carry laws simply don't bring down crime.

Lott says in his libel complaint that "The term 'replicate' has an objective meaning in the world of academic research and scholarship" and Levitt's statement is defamatory per se because it attacks his professional integrity.

According to Lott, "replicate" means other scholars analyzed the same data he analyzed and used the same method of analyzing it "in order to determine whether they can reach the same result." Levitt, therefore, is "alleging that Lott falsified his results."

Apparently, however, even scientists cannot agree on the technical meaning of "replicate." The standard dictionary definition is "repeat" or "reproduce."

Since the case is one of libel-by-implication, an ordinary reader would have to infer that other scholars failed to reproduce the same results as Lott because he faked them. That is surely not the reasonable inference that the law requires.

In a motion to dismiss, Levitt argues that his statement was a protected expression of opinion, that it is not capable of a defamatory per se meaning and that it is capable of a reasonable, non-defamatory per se interpretation.

Lott did not sue Levitt's co-author, journalist Stephen J. Dubner. The two economists aren't exactly friends, reports The Chronicle of Higher Education, which quoted another scholar as saying, "These guys don't send each other Christmas cards, let's just say that."

6/5/06

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Insurer Alleges Claims Fraud 'Big Love'-Style

"Big Love" meets insurance fraud in a lawsuit that alleges a member of a polygamy-practicing family misrepresented herself as a house guest to collect insurance benefits for property lost in a fire.

Mary Keaton, the third wife of a polygamist, lived with her children in a Bountiful, Utah, home owned by her father-in-law, Joseph Kingston. A July 1997 fire caused substantial damage to the home, which had been divided into two separate residences.

According to a complaint filed by Continental Insurance, a homeowners policy issued to Kingston in March 1997 did not cover Keaton, who occupied the "North Side" residence which sustained most of the fire damage.

So Keaton, Kingston and other family members, the suit says, devised a scheme to submit insurance claims for Keaton's damaged or destroyed personal property in the name of her sister-in-law, Rebecca Kingston, who had formerly lived in the home and was covered under the policy.

As part of this scheme, the conspirators allegedly misrepresented to Continental that Rebecca was the "North Side” resident at the time of the fire and that "Mary Keaton was simply a friend of Rebecca Kingston who was a temporary house guest."

Keaton was, in fact, a tenant of Joseph Kingston paying rent and utilities, Continental says.

The complaint does not mention how Continental discovered the alleged fraud. It does say, however, that Keaton inflated the value of the claims by replacing her lost property -- "much of which had been obtained from second-hand thrift stores and sales" -- with items of "far superior" quality and value.

The Kingstons belong to one of the largest polygamous groups in the country, consisting of some 1,200 members.

6/2/06

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Farmer-Vet Bond Saves Cow Poisoning Claims

The 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that negligence claims against a factory for poisoning dairy cows are not time-barred because a farmer gave too much weight to the opinion of a vet in trying to discover why the animals were sick.

Merrill Mest and his wife sued Cabot Corp. in 2001, alleging that fluoride emissions from the company's specialty metals factory in Montgomery County, Pa., had poisoned his cows by contaminating vegetation. Fluorosis, derived from fluoride exposure, causes symptoms in cows including lower milk production and conception rates.

A statute of limitations may run from the time of the discovery of the cause of an injury as long as the plaintiff exercised due diligence in trying to determine the cause. While the Mests first noticed sick cows in 1980, they argued they were unable to determine the cause until 1999.

In 1982, they had hired a vet and a nutritionist at Penn State University who concluded from the results of an investigation of feed samples that the cows did not suffer from fluorosis.

But U.S. District Judge Cynthia M. Rufe summarily dismissed the case as time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations, ruling it was distinguishable from a precedent involving the same defendant.

In Debiec v. Cabot Corp., 352 F.3d 117 (2003), the 3rd Circuit held the discovery rule applied to the case of a woman who died of a disease caused by exposure to beryllium after her doctor diagnosed her with another illness.

"A person's reliance on his or her personal physician's diagnosis is not the same as a farmer's reliance on the conclusions of a veterinarian or scientist," Rufe said. While the patient in Debiec had built up "a relationship" with her doctor, "There is no evidence of such a relationship between Mr. Mest and the [Penn State] doctors."

In reversing Rufe, the 3rd Circuit called that distinction "irrelevant" for the purpose of deciding whether the Mests reasonably relied on what they were told in 1982.

"Farmers arguably rely more on the professional abilities of veterinarians and animal scientists than patients rely on their doctors," the opinion said, noting that

farmers can only observe the objective symptoms of their animals and must rely on veterinarians and animal scientists to interpret those objective symptoms, whereas human patients know what they are experiencing and can describe it to their doctors.

This case also suggests vets can be relied on to screw up as much as doctors.

6/1/06

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Katrina Plaintiffs Facing Proximate Cause Test

Two Hurricane Katrina insurance coverage cases in Mississippi may help decide whether plaintiffs can distinguish between losses caused by wind and rain and those caused by flooding.

Senior U.S. District Judge L.T. Senter recently refused to dismiss the cases against State Farm and Allstate, finding that provisions in their homeowners policies "created ambiguities in the context of damages sustained by the insured during a hurricane."

In Tuepker v. State Farm, the insurer relied in part on the convoluted language of an "anti-concurrent cause" provision to argue that its policy does not cover the losses of a Long Beach, Miss., couple whose home was damaged by Katrina.

The clause, as Senter put it, "purport[s] to exclude coverage for wind and rain damage, both of which are covered losses under this policy, where an excluded cause of loss, e.g. water damage, excludes coverage."

But the judge said in a May 24 opinion that the clause is "ambiguous in light of the other policy provisions granting coverage for wind and rain damage and in light of the inclusion of a 'hurricane deductible' as part of the policy."

Allstate failed for similar reasons in March to force dismissal of the Katrina-related claims of a Gulfport couple by invoking an exclusion of coverage for wind and rain damage where water damage is "the predominant cause of the loss." Buente v. Allstate

In both cases, Senter held the plaintiffs may recover for their losses

To the extent that [they] can prove their allegations that the hurricane winds (or objects driven by those winds) and rains entering the insured premises through openings caused by the hurricane winds proximately caused damage to their insured property.

Ironically, this type of proximate cause analysis is exactly what Katrina victims in a Louisiana case want to avoid. A state law, they argued in a motion for summary judgment, requires their insurer to pay out the full value of their policies irrespective of whether damage was caused by wind or water.

But U.S. District Judge Richard T. Haik ruled May 18 that the so-called Valued Policy Law did not apply and the homeowners should get only "what they paid for," that is, coverage for wind damage.

A plaintiffs' attorney had told the judge unavailingly that it would be difficult if not impossible to determine how much damage was caused by wind in a home that was completely destroyed by a combination of wind and water. "How do you realistically get in and separate those issues?" he asked.

5/31/06

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Porn Videos Again Good Cause for Firing Cops

Moonlighting in porn has again proven costly for police officers as an appeals court ruled that two Florida sheriff's deputies were properly fired for taking part in sexually explicit photos and videos.

Ronald Thaeter and Timothy Moran, who performed for pay-per-view Web sites operated by the wife of a colleague, invoked the First Amendment in challenging their termination from the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office.

In a similar case from California, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2004 that courts should balance the speech of a government employee with the "proper functioning of government offices," which cannot be compromised. Roe v. City of San Diego

But the speech must also involve a "matter of public concern." And the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said Thaeter and Moran couldn't pass that threshold test.

"Similar to the pornographic conduct of the police officer in Roe, the paid participation of Deputies Thaeter and Moran in pornographic photographing and videotaping for Internet display for a fee 'does not qualify as a matter of public concern under any view of the public concern test,'" the opinion concluded.

Under the Palm Beach County sheriff's ethics code, an employee agrees to "keep my private life unsullied as an example to all." A sheriff's investigator found that rule vague, but the 11th Circuit said the plaintiffs' conduct "reflected on their fitness as deputies and undermined public confidence in the PBCSO."

5/30/06

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Judge Jilts Man Attacking Dating Service Policy

A California judge has ruled that an online dating service can continue to exclude married people from membership, dealing a blow to a man going through a divorce who claimed the policy is discriminatory.

"Plaintiff has not established a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of this case at trial," Alameda County Superior Court Judge Frank Roesch said in a brief order denying John Claassen's motion for a preliminary injunction.

Claassen, an Oakland attorney who is separated from his wife, claimed he was entitled to an injunction requiring eHarmony.com to accept him as a member because a dating service cannot rationally justify excluding people on the basis of marital status.

California's Unruh Civil Rights Act applies to a business establishment that arbitrarily discriminates among patrons.

"[N]o California public policy -– let alone a strong one –- supports a business establishment's interference in the highly personal decision of when and with whom a person should associate once his or her marriage effectively ends through the filing of dissolution proceedings," Claassen, representing himself, said in a court brief (excerpted here).

But eHarmony contended that California "has established a clear public policy in favor of marital reconciliation," noting that, under the state's Family Code, a judge must not dissolve a marriage "whenever there appears any 'reasonable possibility of reconciliation.'"

eHarmony's exclusion of married people, the company argued in opposing an injunction,

constitutes an eminently practical and reasonable means for eHarmony to avoid facilitating extra-marital relationships involving 'separated' people for whom reconciliation remains a possibility.

In fact, the Family Code allows a stay of dissolution in a no-fault case for 30 days if there is a chance the parties will reconcile. Assuming California has this "clear" public policy, Claassen has a point in saying it is not "strong" enough to overcome the Unruh Act's stand against discrimination.

But having lost the preliminary injunction battle, the plaintiff has pretty much lost the war. In his complaint, he also seeks $12,000 in statutory damages.

5/29/06

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Apple Crushed in Free-Speech Win for Bloggers

Free speech on the Internet won a huge victory today as a California appeals court found that Apple Computer cannot force two tech-gossip blogs to divulge the sources who allegedly leaked trade secret information to them.

The 6th District Court of Appeal shredded not only Apple's arguments for disclosure but also the trial judge who last year denied the motion of the online publishers of Power Page and Apple Insider to protect their sources from Apple subpoenas.

Apple belittled the bloggers' journalistic efforts as beneath the protection of California's press shield law, and Santa Clara County Superior Court Judge James P. Kleinberg held that Apple's right to "keep and maintain proprietary information" about a new product code-named "Asteroid" trumped the free-speech rights of the two Web sites.

But the appeals court refused to distinguish between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" news, concluding in its opinion that

If [the bloggers'] activities and social function differ at all from those of traditional print and broadcast journalists, the distinctions are minute, subtle, and constitutionally immaterial.

Presiding Justice Conrad L. Rushing, writing for the court, also could not have been more forceful in rejecting Kleinberg's dismissive view that the bloggers' postings did nothing more than feed "the public's insatiable desire for information."

"[A]ny movement by such a cultural leader [as Apple] into a whole new area of expression -- as was promised by the Asteroid product –- is newsworthy," Rushing said, and

The lawful acquisition of information necessary to anticipate and respond to such changes is the birthright of every human.

Apple obtained a court order to subpoena Power Page and Apple Insider as part of a lawsuit accusing unidentified defendants of misappropriating trade secrets and passing them onto the sites. The company has questioned employees known to have access to Asteroid marketing materials.

But the 6th District said any sympathy for Apple in its quest to identify "treacherous" employees "cannot blind us to the gross impropriety of using the courts and their powers of compulsory process as a tool and adjunct of an employer’s personnel department."

In some ways, Rushing has done here for bloggers' rights what the U.S. Supreme Court did for "traditional" journalists' rights in New York Times v. Sullivan. The decision should withstand any California Supreme Court review and force the dismissal of Apple's related suit against Nick dePlume, publisher of the Think Secret tech-gossip site.

UPDATE ... Apple did not appeal to the California Supreme Court, leaving the 6th District's decision to stand as precedent.

5/26/06

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Mandel v. Boston Phoenix (Opinion in Libel Case)

Humphrey v. Viacom (Complaint in Fantasy Sports Case)

Harper v. Poway Unified School Dist. (Order Denying Rehearing)

Jane Doe v. Oberweis Dairy (Opinion in Sexual Harassment Case)

Studs Terkel v. AT&T (Opinion in NSA Surveillance Case)

Camp v. Anderson (Opinion in Dog Stomping Case)

Andersen v. King County (Opinion in Same-Sex Marriage Case)

Andersen v. King County (Dissent)

Mammone v. Harvard College (Opinion in Disability Bias Case)

Hollis v. Joseph (Motion to Dismiss)

Boyd v. SBC Advanced Solutions (Opinion)

Opala v. Watt (Opinion in Judge's Age Bias Case)

Hollis v. Joseph (DontDateHimGirl Complaint)

John B. v. Superior Court (Opinion in HIV Infection Case)

Beard v. Banks (Opinion in Prisoner Rights Case)

Escalante v. Otis Elevator Co. (Complaint in Elevator Ordeal Case)

Schneider v. California Coastal Commission (Opinion)

Dummar v. Lummis (Complaint in Howard Hughes Will Case)

Hepting v. AT&T Corp. (Order in NSA Surveillance Case)

Deegan Patterson v. U.S. (Opinion in FBI Scandal Case)

Twist v. McFarlane (Opinion in Publicity Rights Case)

Bourne v. Gilman (Opinion in Goalpost Injury Case)

Doe v. MySpace Inc. (Complaint in Internet Seduction Case)

Jensen v. State of Utah (Order on Motions to Dismiss)

Loeb Shloss v. Sweeney (Complaint in James Joyce Copyright Dispute)

Dubay v. Wells (Response to Motion to Dismiss)

Doe v. Holy See (Order on Motion to Dismiss)

Jensen v. Cashin (Complaint in 'Muscle Car' Crash Case)

Jensen v. Cashin (Counterclaim)

Lott v. Levitt (Motion to Dismiss)

Avista Management v. Wausau Underwriters ('Rock, Paper, Scissors' Order)

DiMeo v. Max (Opinion in Internet Speech Case)

Bard v. Jahnke (Opinion in Bull Attack Case)

Lott v. Levitt (Complaint in 'Freakonomics' Libel Case)

Continental Insurance v. Keaton (Complaint)

Mest v. Cabot Corp. (Opinion in Cow Poisoning Case)

Tuepker v. State Farm (Opinion in Hurricane Katrina Case)

Thaeter v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office (Ruling in Officer Porn Case)

Claassen v. eHarmony (Opp'n to Motion for Preliminary Injunction)

O'Grady v. Superior Court (Opinion in Apple Bloggers' Case)

Jane Doe v. Nick Nolte (Declaration of Nolte)

Orlando v. Alarm One (Judgment in Workplace Spanking Case)

Daniel Kapone v. Michael Jackson (New Molestation Lawsuit)

Liysa Northon v. Ann Rule (New Complaint)

M.J. v. Warren Jeffs (Sexual Abuse Case Against Polygamy Prophet)